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Remembering James Nelson Goodsell
Don Bohning

im Goodsell, the long
time Latin Am erican cor
respondent from the
Christian Science Monitor
had that great quality of
being both a good
re p o rter and a first-rate
hum an being. I first m et
Jim in 1966 in the Dom inican
Republic in advance o f that coun
try’s first post-civil war elections. I
last saw Jim in mid-January 1996
when we had lunch to kick around
some agenda ideas for the
F ourteenth A nnual Journalists and
Editors Workshop. H e will be
missed.
Jim , as many o f us dinosaurs, had
grown increasingly concerned about
the state of journalism and particu
larly foreign reporting in the m od
ern age. Despite the trem endous
technological advances, in some
ways, m atters were m uch less com 
plex and m ore straightforw ard 30
years or so ago. In that light, it
m ight be m ore instructive attem pt
ing to predict the shape of foreign
coverage into the 21st century by
taking a look backwards to see how
far we have come in the past three
decades.
Com m unications were horrible 30
years ago. T he m ain source o f news
into the newsroom was the teletype
m achine, roaring along at 60 words
a m inute. T he same day New York
Times was unavailable except for sto
ries that moved on its wire service.
O nce the Sunday Times showed up
in the newsroom on Tuesday. The
one advantage was that you could

J

Don Bohning is a staff writerfor the
Miami H erald. He has been with the
H erald for 36 years.
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Jim, as many of us dinosaurs, had groum increasingly
concerned about the state of journalism and particularly
foreign reporting in the modern age.
write the same story a week after the
Times had it, and no Herald reader
would know the difference. U nited
Press International was still fighting
the good fight with the Associated
Press. Editing was literally a cut and
paste job.
T he Herald did no t even have a
telex m achine in the newsroom at
that time. The only telex m achine
in the building was in advertising on
the second floor. A case was finally
m ade for a newsroom telex after the
shooting by the US M arines o f my
predecessor, A1 Burt, and a Herald
photographer, Doug Kennedy, d u r
ing the 1965 Dom inican Republic
Civil War— an incident which hap
pened 31 years ago.
Lee Winfrey, an o th er Herald cor
respondent from the W ashington
bureau was also in the Dom inican
Republic. It was impossible to get a
telephone call in or out of the coun
try. Two days after the shooting, the
Herald had no t heard from Winfrey
and details of the incident and the
condition o f A1 and Doug rem ained
uncertain. Editors in the newsroom
were cursing Winfrey until an em 
ployee from advertising called the
newsroom and said there was this
long telex downstairs on the ma
chine that they could no t figure out.
H e thought the telex m ight belong
to the newsroom. It did. The telex
gave W infrey’s detailed account of
the shooting incident. T he message
had been on advertising’s telex
m achine for well over 24 hours

before anyone in that dep artm en t
had bothered to notify the news
room.
As an anecdotal footnote to that
incident, my first trip to the
Dom inican Republic came ju st a
year later and it was the one in
which I m et Jim Goodsell. Goodsell,
myself and, Nate Miller, the Riobased correspondent for the
Baltimore Sun (who went on to
becom e a well-known naval histori
an) hired a taxi and drove to
Santiago to interview A ntonio
Guzman, Ju an Bosch’s vice presi
dential candidate in the upcom ing
elections, won by Joaquin Balaguer.
The taxi driver was the same one
who had been driving A1 Burt and
Doug Kennedy w hen they had been
shot by the M arines a year earlier.
It was an era of erratic and ulcerinducing telephone com m unica
tions. To cover a breaking foreign
story by telephone was virtually
impossible. Calls had to be placed
through an operator and, particu
larly in time o f crisis, telephone
lines were so jam m ed that it often
took hours to get a call through.
And if it happened to be a military
coup, a frequent occurrence in the
1960s, telephone lines were most
likely cut.
If you were on the road, getting
stories back to the Herald was an o th 
er problem . You either brought
them back with you or took them to
the local airport and shipped them
by Pan Am Clipper cargo. W hen

C om m entary

the flight arrived in Miami, som eone
had to go to the cargo area on the
west side o f the airport, pick up the
package and clear it through cus
toms. On m ore pressing stories, the
only alternative was to file by telex,
usually by punching the telex tape
yourself.
T he major airlines flying to Latin
America then were Pan American,
Braniff and Panagra. Nobody in
Latin America had ever heard of
American or U nited Airlines. And
virtually every flight to South
America stopped in Panam a at 3:00
a.m. for a change of planes. If you
needed to get a seat quickly on a
sold-out Pan Am flight, you called
Alice Flood at Pan Ain’s commercial
desk.
R eporting itself was somewhat sim
pler. The Cold War was in full swing
and the us-against-them mentality
spilled over into m uch of the press.
US officials still had substantial cred
ibility, with the decline beginning in
the late 1960s with Vietnam and
accelerated by Chile and Watergate.
Unlike today, women correspon
dents covering Latin America were a
rarity. Georgia Anne “G eegee” Geyer
is the only one I can recall, writing
from P eru for the Chicago Daily News
service.
It was not until the first half o f the
1980s that portable com puters came
on the scene, n o t too long after
direct telephone dialing. Until
then, the Olivetti Letra 22 typewriter
was the choice de jour. I still have
two at hom e but cannot find any
body to recondition them . Juan
Tamayo becam e the first person at
the Herald to use a portable com put
er, som etime in the early 1980s. It
was an O trono and to call it port
able is stretching the truth. I
rem em ber m ore than once Tamayo
walking out o f the office with that
thing strapped on his back. Then
came the Tandy 200, a laptop com
p uter model.
T hat brings us up to the inform a
tion and transportation revolution
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three

Journalists are reporters like Jim Goodsell who go
off to uncomfortable and often dangerous places like
Central America and Croatia and get on a m ilitary
plane to chase after a visiting dignitary without
giving it a second thought.
of recent years which has dramatical
ly im proved the timeliness o f getting
the news to the consumer. The rev
olution also has its downside, one
being an increase in ‘parachute’
journalism which mitigates against
good old-fashioned reporting. Now,
a reporter can fly to a country that
he has never been to before on a
breaking story, having access in
advance to virtually everything that
has been written about the country.
O nce there, he can call down the
latest wires, write an authoritative
story, file it for the deadline and
leave, w ithout m aking a telephone
call except to connect to his com
puter. As an example, I cite the
recent inauguration of Rene Preval
as Flaiti’s new president. A reporter
from a major newspaper, which shall
rem ain unnam ed, was assigned at
the last m inute to cover the inaugu
ration. Only slightly familiar with
Haiti, he arrived m id-afternoon on
inauguration day, after the cere
m onies were over. Catching up on
what had happened from colleagues
and calling down the wires, he wrote
and filed a story of the day’s events,
and left early the next m orning,
spending about 18 hours in the
country. The story, which I later
saw, was adequate bu t certainly did
no t contain m uch insight into
H aiti’s problems. T here is also a
trend toward m ore generalists
am ong foreign correspondents as
opposed to the specialists such as
Jim Goodsell who dedicated their
careers to a single region, w hether it
be Latin America, Africa or Asia.
I will venture no guesses as to what
will happen on the technological

side o f journalism over the next
few years, having myself barely got
ten past the Tandy 200s and direct
dial telephoning. I assume it is
safe to say, however, th at the
changes are likely to be startling.
T he m ajor story them es will cer
tainly continue to be related to the
dram atic changes that began with
the en d o f the Cold War. O n the
positive side, social issues will get
m uch m ore attention, now that
they are no longer subjugated to
an ideological overlay. T he war on
drugs will rem ain a high profile
topic. Coverage o f free m arket
econom ics and a hem isphere free
trade area will get m ajor attention.
C hanges of governm ent— less so
with overt m ilitary coups seemingly
h eaded the way o f the dodo b ird —
will also be covered. Terrorism ,
ethnic conflicts and b o rd e r dis
putes will continue to capture
headlines. T he In te rn e t will feed
the influence o f NGOs, hum an
rights and advocacy groups, m aking
it b etter able for them to get th eir
messages out to the m edia and
opinion makers.
In closing, I came across som e
thing recently written ab out an o th 
er journalist, that struck me as par
ticularly applicable to Jim Goodsell
and today’s journalism . Some of
you will probably recognize the
story. I would like to read it, substi
tuting J im ’s nam e for the o th er
journalist, N athaniel Nash.
From Tom F ried m an ’s April 10
colum n in the New York Times on
N athaniel Nash, who died in the
crash o f C om m erce Secretary Ron
Brow n’s airplane:

C om m entary

With today’s cacophony of magazine
shows, Oprah-style interview sessions and
talking head news commentaries, many
people have lost sight of what real jour
nalists do. Journalists do not appear on
the McLaughlin show and scream at
each other. Journalists do not interview
mothers and daughters on daytime con
fession hours. Journalists do not have
their own shock-jock radio shows.
Unfortunately, though, these are the peo
ple many Americans see most often in
quasi-journalist roles and these are the
people they think of as journalists today.
Journalists are reporters likeJim
Goodsell who go off to uncomfortable and
often dangerous places like Central
America and Croatia and get on a mili
tary plane to chase after a visiting digni
tary without giving it a second
thought— all to get a few fresh quotes,
maybe a scoop, or even just a paragraph
of color that no one else has...
Jim ivas a living reminder that to be
successful, journalists do not have to be
cynics. The book on Jim as a reporter
was that he was too nice. His colleagues
always doubted that anyone that nice
could ever succeed in journalism, but
somehow he triumphed over that handi
cap and went from one successful assign
ment to another. It ivas becauseJim
intuitively understood that there was a
difference between skepticism and cyni
cism. This is a lesson a lot of us have
forgotten. Skepticism is about asking
questions, being dubious, being tuary, not
being gullible. Cynicism is about already
having the answers— or thinking you
do— about a person or an event. The
skeptic says: “I don’t think that’s true;
I ’m going to check it out. ” The cynic
says: “Iknow that’s not true. It couldn’t
be. I ’m going to slam him. ” There is a
fine line between the two, but it is a line
Jim always respected. H

Com m ents delivered by Don
Bohning, a 36-year veteran staff
writer for the Miami Herald, at the
Fourteenth A nnual Journalists and
Editors Workshop, Miami, May 2,
1996.
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Popular Participation Bolivian Style
M argaret H . Peirce

hen President
Gonzalo Sanchez
de Lozada, the
author o f the
1985 draconian
neoliberal
reform which curbed Bolivia’s
hyperinflation, took office on
August 6, 1993, few were willing to
concede that his am bitious Plan de
Todos (Plan for All) would succeed.
O ne of the principal pillars of the
plan was the notion of “popular par
ticipation,” an innovative proposal
to restructure Bolivia. Criticized by
the opposition and highly praised by
the international community,
Sanchez de Lozada plugged along
with his plan. In the past two years,
while the rest of his Plan for All
appears to have been bogged down,
"popular participation” has begun
to perm eate all levels and corners of
Bolivian society.

W

Each municipality is now responsible
for infrastructure and developm ent
related to education, health, irriga
tion, sports, culture, and local roads.
Municipalities receive coparticipa
tion funds (i.e., central governmentcontrolled tax revenues) to fulfill
these needs.
The law provides for the legal
recognition of urban barrios and
rural com m unities as Organizaciones
Tenitori.ales de Base (Territorially
Based Organizations or TBOs) and
establishes oversight boards known
as comites de vigilancia (vigilance com
mittees) . These committees are
charged with planning projects and
overseeing m unicipal governments.
The PPL provides governm ent funds
and redistributes political power to
the local level. According to World
Bank econom ist Vicente Fretes-Cibis,
“O ther countries are now trying to
decentralize, but Bolivia is the pio
neer.”

I m p l e m e n t in g P a r t ic ip a t io n

Following a massive m edia blitz on
April 21, 1994, President Sanchez de
Lozada succeeded in securing con
gressional approval for the revolu
tionary and controversial Popular
Participation Law (PPL). The PPL
divided Bolivia territorially into
provincial sections, thereby putting
the country u n d er the political and
administrative control of 308 newly
created municipalities, which were
endowed with provisional bound
aries. The new m unicipal boundaries
replaced 1,100 local governments.

Margaret H. Peirce is a Ph.D. student
at the Graduate School of Internation
al Studies at the University of Miam i.
She served as a Peace Corps Volunteer
in Bolivia from 1991-93.
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E m p o w e r in g C ivil S o c ie t y

Bolivia's history of confrontational
politics has frequently stood in the
way of dem ocratic governance.
Social groups have relied on direct
action protest, such as hunger
strikes, blockades, work stoppages,
marches, and takeovers o f public
buildings. Years of such behavior
have led civil society to rely on these
tools as the most significant form of
political participation, eclipsing par
ties and the electoral arena. Since
the transition to democracy in 1982,
political parties on the national level
have repudiated these m ethods, but
local leaders and labor unions con
tinue to rely upon these tactics to
contest governm ent action, especial
ly the imposition of austerity meas
ures and counternarcotics policy.

The stated goal o f the Popular
Participation Law is to improve the
standard of living of the poor and
traditionally marginalized sectors by
incorporating them into the deci
sion-making process, thereby curtail
ing direct action politics. A sec
ondary goal of the PPL is to stamp
out still existing traces o f authoritari
an behavior and replace it with a
participatory democracy based upon
consensus politics on all levels of
society and government.
According to the 1992 Census,
70.5 percent of the Bolivian popula
tion is classified as poor, including
95.1 percent o f the rural population
and 52.6 percent of the urban popu
lation. Bolivia has the lowest life
expectancy (61.8 years in 1994), the
highest infant mortality rate
(81.4/1,000 in 1994), a population
with the least years of schooling (4),
and the worst H um an Development
Index (122) o f South America.
Worse yet are the indicators o f inter
nal inequality. For example, infant
mortality in 1992 in urban areas was
62/1,000 com pared to 100/1,000 in
the rural areas; 81 percent o f urban
dwellers had access to potable water
in 1992 com pared with only 19 per
cent of rural families; and finally,
while only 9 percent of city dwellers
are illiterate, the rural population is
37 percent illiterate. Intraregional
inequality and internal differences
in standard o f living have prom pted
m igratory flows, both international
and rural-urban in nature. The
1992 Census, which is generally
acknowledged to have undercount
ed the rural population, indicated
that 57.5 percent o f the population
lives in urban areas (arbitrarily
defined as cities o f m ore than 2,000
inhabitants). O ne estimate suggests

R

S
Decentralizing political and economic power

that by the year 2000, 85 percent of
Bolivia’s population will live in
urban centers with a population
greater than 100,000. Santa Cruz
and El Alto, for example, are expect
ed to double their population in ten
years. Many in the governm ent and
elsewhere suggest that the PPL was
designed to offset this m igratory
trend.
R e d is t r ib u t in g P a r t ic ip a t io n F u n d s

With the change in the distribu
tion of state resources via the copar
ticipation funds m andated by the
PPL, funds are now assigned on a
p er capita basis, with approximately
US$ 22.00 being allocated per resi
d en t (according to the 1992 Census).
This am ount com pares favorably
with the average US$ 14.77 distrib
uted between 1989 and 1993, which
ranged from a high o f US$ 24.01 per
capita in the departm ent o f La Paz
to a low o f US$ 1.50 in the depart
m ent of Potosi. The average 1995
m unicipal budget is approximately
US$ 420,000, while the m edian bud
get is about US$ 160,000 p er year.
M unicipal coparticipation funds
accounted for 20 percent of the
national treasury’s expenditures, or
approximately US$ 144 million in
1995. The PPL m andates that 90
percent o f coparticipation funds be
directed towards investm ent in infra
structure, leaving 10 percent for
adm inistration. Com plaints were
thus heard from cash-strapped
m unicipal governments.
These coparticipation funds
include the 10 percent o f treasury
expenditures formerly assigned to
the quasi-governmental Regional
Development C orporations (RDCs),
which, in accordance with the
Administrative Decentralization Law

passed on July 28, 1995, were elimi
nated in 1996. Some corporations,
faced with the loss of their funding,
entered into jo in t ventures with
municipalities which lacked suffi
cient technical personnel; the
municipality “contracted” the RDC
to im plem ent various rural develop
m ent projects solicited by the TBOs
and transferred the necessary funds
to the RDC. Additionally, a
D epartm ental C om pensation Fund
has been created for resource poor
regional departm ents, such as
Pando.
Eighty percent of the m unicipali
ties that received m oney in 1994 had
never received any money from the
national treasury. In 1994, 54 per
cent of coparticipation funds were
directed toward cities and 45 per
cent toward provinces. The three
major cities' share was 74.9 percent,
down from 90.8 percent. With the
transfer of responsibilities for infra
structure developm ent and m ainte
nance, some municipalities, especial
ly those that were previously favored,
may end up with fewer budgetary
resources. However, to augm ent
their budgets, the PPL gives munici
palities the power to tax m otor vehi
cles and real estate.
M u n ic ip a l G o v e r n m e n t s

Before the passage o f the PPL,
only a limited num ber o f provincial
capitals had functioning municipal
governments. As a result o f the PPL,
Article 203 o f the 1967 Constitution,
which states that m unicipal jurisdic
tions are to be determ ined and local
governm ents established, is finally
being enacted. The most populated
m unicipality is that of La Paz, with
724,000 residents. The average
m unicipal population is 21,000; how

ever, the majority of municipalities
are smaller and predom inantly rural
in nature. Approximately one-third
of the m unicipalities have less than
5,000 inhabitants. These m unicipali
ties are encouraged to band togeth
er to form mancomunidades (com
monwealths) to have access to funds
through a PPL bank account.
Interviews with local and central
governm ent officials in the sum m er
of 1995 indicated that the concept
of popular participation was taking
root far m ore readily in the rural
areas than in the urban centers.
T here were m ore rural TBOs and
vigilance committees than urban
ones and m ore registered neighbor
hood groups in the m arginal parts
of the city than in the casco viejo
(old city center). U rban centers
already have health and educational
facilities and basic utilities—water,
electricity, sewerage, and telephone
service. Rural areas, by com parison,
lack almost all of these fundam ental
services and are, therefore, m ore
motivated to work together to pro
vide for these basic hum an needs.
Additionally, many rural com m u
nities already have their own forms
of traditional local governance
which can easily be recognized by
the central governm ent. U rban
dwellers, on the other hand, have lit
tle incentive to organize on the local
level. However, many argue that the
rem aining local governm ents that
oppose the PPL will be forced to
change their posture by the popu
lace, who will dem and the benefits
from the newly available funds.
P o p u l a r P a r t ic ip a t io n ’s O

pponents

Powerful civic com m ittees (similar
to “friends o f cities” groups) consti
tuted by self-appointed influential
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three
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businesspersons are opposed to the
PPL. In the m ajor cities, these polit
ically dom inant m em bers of the
business sector stand to lose politi
cal power, and therefore, as a m at
ter of self-preservation, the civic
com m ittees are opposed to the leg
islation that actually benefits their
cities.
O thers co n ten d that the PPL is
only a redistribution scheme, rath er
than an increase in funding. This
criticism, however, misses the point
since the rationale beh in d the law is
to im prove the equity o f the distrib
ution o f funds and increase partici
pation at the local level.
T he m ain criticism o f the actual
im plem entation o f the plan is that
coparticipation funds are being dis
tributed to all m unicipalities that
have filed an an n u al operation plan
with the governm ent, regardless of
w hether there is a functioning vigi
lance com m ittee to provide
accountability and transparency.
Consequently, these funds are sus
ceptible to co rru p tion. And in the
larger cites where TBOs have yet to
be form ed, the use o f coparticipa
tion funds is left to the discretion of
the mayor and h is /h e r m unicipal
council. This practice increases the
possibility o f pork barreling.
Additionally, th ere is a conflict of
interest and jo b function between
the ju n ta municipal/consejo municipal
(m unicipal councils) and vigilance
com m ittees since bo th are designed
to supervise the expenditures of
m unicipal funds. T here are also no
provisions for the rem uneration of
com m ittee m em bers. F urtherm ore,
m unicipal governm ents are receiv
ing a trem endous increase in copar
ticipation funds w ithout adequate
adm inistrative or legal training.
However, several training assistance
contracts have b een signed with the
U nited States Agency for
In tern atio n al Developm ent
(USAID), the World Bank, and
n o ngovernm ent organizations
(NGOs).
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three

T he central governm ent’s
response to these criticisms has
been that rather than spend twenty
years ironing out all the possible
wrinkles of the plan, it was prefer
able to pass the legislation and redis
tribute the funds to the people in an
equitable m anner. The rationale was
that problem s could be sorted out
with time and experience.
O n another front, some contend
that the PPL is a politically motivat
ed program to build the electoral
base of the president's Nationalist
Revolutionary Movement Party
(MNR). Certainly, Sanchez de
Lozada would like to be rem em 
bered as the president who took rev
olutionary steps to restructure the
Bolivian governm ent. By decentral
izing political and econom ic power,
however, Sanchez de Lozada is los
ing the ability to direct funds to
MNR-controlled m unicipalities. If
his hidden agenda were to exploit
the program to bolster his party’s
image and election prospects,
Sanchez de Lozada has encountered
failure.
A cynical interpretation o f the
whole issue surrounding the pros
and cons of the PPL is that if funds
are likely to be stolen, at least now
these funds will be stolen or misused
by many on the local level rather
than by a feiu at the national level. If
this is the case, a perverse redistribu
tion scheme is now in place. As the
president said, “Even if they’re
drunk, they can’t do a worse jo b
than we’ve d o n e.”
P r o m o t io n

and

P a r t ic ip a t io n

To prom ote the concept o f popu
lar participation and improve citizen
awareness o f the PPL, the
C om m unications D epartm ent o f the
National Secretariat for Popular
Participation in the Ministry of
Sustainable D evelopm ent has
launched a campaign the likes of
which Bolivia has never seen.
G overnm ent and in d ep en d en t agen
cies are prom oting the PPL.

Moreover, these agencies are
responsible for the m ultitude of
pam phlets and discussion docu
m ents currently circulating
throughout the country, many of
which use a simple form at and pic
tures to aid non-native Spanish
speakers.
Interestingly, even the military is
involved in this new initiative to for
tify democracy. The Bolivian A rm ed
Forces have traditionally been
charged with helping to develop the
country and actively participate in
public works projects. New recruits
are now routinely taught the intrica
cies o f the PPL. W hen these
recruits retu rn to their com m uni
ties, they serve as experts on the
law.
C o n c l u s io n

Bolivia's PPL is indeed revolution
ary and unique to Latin America.
Bolivians have been given the politi
cal and econom ic tools to partici
pate in their own governance. The
PPL has taken root in rural areas
and is igniting debate th ro u g h o u t
the country. In short, areas that
never before benefited from any
national resources are receiving
funds and are deciding how to
spend them . Despite the kinks in
the program and the funds’ suscep
tibility to corruption and political
influence, the PPL is certainly a step
in the right direction.
T he PPL appears destined to play
a role in econom ic developm ent
and dem ocratic governance in
Bolivia. C oupled with a new
Administrative Decentralization
Law, the PPL could m odernize the
Bolivian state and em power the sub
ordinate and less privileged parts of
civil society. Vice President Victor
H ugo Cardenas claims that these
bold steps “will change the face of
Bolivia.” Thus, these historic devel
opm ents should be m onitored by
o ther countries; lessons can be
learned from this dram atic political
and econom ic restructuring. ■
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How Real Is the Plano Real?
Alfred Montero

n July 1, 1996, the
Three years later, the entire country is still monitoring
Plano Real (Real
Plan), Brazil’s most
monthly inflation rates and trade balance figures with bated
watched, ongoing
national event,
breath to see if the plan will continue to deliver on Cardoso’s
tu rn ed two years old.
campaign promises of low inflation and stable growth.
F ernando H enrique Cardoso
dep en d ed upon the p lan ’s initial
success in reducing Brazil’s chronic
mega-inflation to carry him to the
Real has dep en d ed upon the stabili
m onthly inflation rates continued
Brazilian presidency in 1994. Three
ty o f its value against the dollar. By
on a stable, low trajectory.
years later, the entire country is still
buying dollars when the currency
Presently, m ost Brazilian businesses
m onitoring m onthly inflation rates
was negotiated at a low rate to the
work with nom inal figures uncor
and trade balance figures with bated
Real and selling when the rate was
rected for the expected rate o f infla
breath to see if the plan will contin
slightly higher, the central bank
tion; indexation o f salaries for infla
ue to deliver on Cardoso’s cam
floated the value of the Real
tion is being phased out.
paign prom ises o f low inflation and
between high and low values, a tac
The success of the Real Plan, how
stable growth. Yet skepticism has
tic that guarded against sudden
ever, has n o t come cheaply to a
been voiced in the business com m u
devaluations bu t nevertheless
country with a long history of failed
nity and am ong international
allowed the new currency to gradu
stabilization plans. T he “b a n d ” sys
observers regarding the p lan ’s
ally devalue. Meanwhile, the central
tem kept the Real overvalued by at
em phasis on the appreciation of the
bank was periodically moving the
least 15-20 percent, although some
national currency and the inability
“bands” within which the Real float
international estimates suggest an
of congress and the presidency to
ed to the dollar. At the beginning
overvaluation in the neighborhood
push forward the m uch-needed con
of the plan, the Real traded at $1.20,
o f 30-40 percent. T he price o f keep
stitutional reforms. The p lan ’s long
but by mid-1996, the Real traded at
ing the Real stable at these levels
term success cannot be assured
$.98.
required the expansion of large for
w ithout these reforms.
D uring its first few m onths, the
eign dollar reserves, a task m ade
In mid-1994, Cardoso’s plan was
Real Plan was a resounding success
m ore difficult by periodic trade
launched with the creation of a new
that assured the election o f Cardoso
deficits. T he overvalued Real
currency, the Real, with a value
as president in late 1994— without
reduced the competitiveness of
anchored to the dollar. Unlike the
the need for a run-off. A nnual rates
exports and put an end to several
m onetary anchor in A rgentina that
of inflation fell from 11,161 percent
years of large annual trade surplus
strictly fixes the national currency to
during the pre-Real days to 24 per
es. And, m ore importantly, the con
the dollar, the Real was allowed to
cent in 1995 and an estim ated 12-15
stitutional and fiscal reform s neces
float within “b an d s” established by
p ercent in 1996, the lowest Brazilian
sary for consolidating m acroeco
the central bank. Similar to the
inflation rates since the 7 percent
nom ic stability—privatization, tax
E uropean M onetary System’s
figure recorded in 1957. And, m ore
reform , reducing the size o f the
m ethod of floating national cu rren 
im portantly, the plan pu t an end to
public payroll, am ong others—were
cies within “b ands” linked to the
the inflationary expectations that in
either delayed or im plem ented at a
Deutschem ark, the viability o f the
the past drove rates spiraling
snail’s pace.
upwards. The slight increases in the
m onthly inflation rates of
“W e a r e n o t M e x ic o !”
Alfred Montero is a Ph.D. candidate in
Septem ber and O ctober 1994 gener
The dangers of an overvalued
Political Science at Columbia University.
ated widespread talk o f the Real
Real were m ade clear shortly after
He is currently an adjunct lecturer at
Plan's prem ature failure, bu t such
the D ecem ber 1994 maxi-devalua
Florida International University.
expectations quickly subsided as
tion crisis in Mexico when a combi-
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Controversy over the thrust of economic reform

nation of large trade deficits and
low dollar reserves left Ernesto
Zedillo’s governm ent unable to pre
vent the dum ping o f $10 billion of
short-term peso bonds by foreign
speculators following an announced
devaluation of the currency. The
resulting crisis presented several
lessons for Brazil.
First, the Mexican exam ple
em phasized the dangers o f m ain
taining long-term , large trade imbal
ances and n o t enforcing a devalua
tion o f the national currency. After
several years of large annual trade
surpluses ($15 billion in 1992, $13
billion in 1993 and $10 billion in
1994), Brazil ran its largest trade
deficit in 15 years in 1995: $3.5 bil
lion. T he initial signs o f a crisis—an
$884 m illion trade deficit in
D ecem ber 1994 and one over $1 bil
lion in February 1995—were
enough to send central bank offi
cials scram bling to counterattack
the spreading fears o f Brazil’s
im pending “M exicanization.”
Adamantly opposed to a Chileanstyle maxi-devaluation, C ardoso’s
governm ent em ployed m ore piece
m eal m ethods to improve Brazil’s
alarm ing trade imbalances. In April
1995, the governm ent increased tar
iffs on im ported autom obiles from
32 percent to 70 p ercent and slight
ly accelerated the pace o f the Real’s
gradual devaluation by use of the
“b a n d ” system.
Second, the Mexican exam ple
pointed to the im portance o f m ain
taining high dom estic dollar
reserves to scare off foreign m one
tary speculators. This lesson proved
especially valuable and costly in
M arch 1995 when fears spread in
the financial com m unity that
A rgentina was w ithout enough

reserves to save its banking system.
T he m ore serious “tequila” effect in
A rgentina generated anxieties
am ong foreign investors in nearby
Brazil. Brazilian central bank offi
cials spent m ore than $7 billion of
reserves in ju st one week to stabilize
the Real against a possible ru n by
speculators. The governm ent’s
reaction also included reducing
taxes on foreign direct investm ent
and raising real interest rates, a
move that increased the flow of for

eign m oney from the m oney m arket
into governm ent debt paper.
A lthough the Real Plan survived
the M arch 1995 scare, many inter
national observers continued to crit
icize the Cardoso adm inistration for
no t dealing with the fundam ental
problem of the currency’s overvalu
ation. T he m ost publicized criticism
was voiced in an academ ic confer
ence in Sydney, Australia, in May
1996 when Massachusetts Institute
o f Technology economist, Rudiger
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three
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D ornbusch, stated that the Real was
overvalued 30-40 percent and that
Brazil was well on its way to becom 
ing an o th er Mexico. D ornbusch’s
com m ents generated an im m ediate
response on the Sao Paulo and Rio
de Jan eiro stock markets—both fell
2 percent. Brazilian governm ent
officials and economists lambasted
D ornbusch’s estim ate of the Reals
overvaluation and pointed to for
eign reserves o f $45 billion, substan
tial increases in foreign direct
investm ent (rather than in poten
tially speculative portfolio invest
m ent) , and stabilizing trade bal
ances during the second half of
1995 and the first half of 1996 as
factors that suggested a situation
most unlike that o f Mexico. As
Eliana Cardoso, one of Brazil’s most
p ro m in en t economists and
D ornbusch’s ex-wife declared in
Folha de Sao Paulo in June: “We are
n o t Mexico!”
An assessment o f the Real P lan’s
perform ance up to its second
anniversary reveals that both
D ornbusch and his critics are right.
The Real is certainly overvalued, but
m ost estimates lie somewhere in the
10-20 p ercent range than in
D ornbusch’s 30-40 percent range.
T he m ain question is how fast the
Real should be devalued. D ornbusch
argued for a maxi-devaluation along
the lines o f the Chilean experience.
Yet the inflationary effects seen in
the Chilean case could prove disas
trous in Brazil where m em ories of
chronic inflation m ight generate
an o th er inflationary spiral following
the initial devaluation.
R ecent developm ents on Brazil's
com m ercial and cu rrent accounts
do n o t justify pushing the panic but
ton of a maxi-devaluation. After the
“tequila” effect scares o f the first
half of 1995, the country’s trade bal
ance im proved and reached a small
surplus of $1.1 billion during the
second half of 1995 and a m odest
deficit of about $300 million in the
first five m onths of 1996. An esti
12 Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three

The probabilities that privatization will rescue Brazil’s
decaying infrastructure are not good. Foreign firms are
wary of venturing into this area since Brasilia has yet to
regulate the process of granting public concessions.
m ated $6 billion o f new foreign
direct investment, $3 billion o f new
portfolio investm ent, and $4 billion
in unilateral transfers from em i
grants are expected to finance this
year’s expected current account
deficit o f $15 billion. T he shortfall
will likely be m ade up by long-term
finance from international agencies.
These indicators suggest that the
prospects for the Reals stability have
not dramatically w orsened as the
peso’s before its collapse in
D ecem ber 1994.
In com parison to Mexico on the
eve o f the “tequila” crisis, Brazil is in
a far better position. While the
Mexican cu rren t account deficit
stood at 7.8 percent of GDP, the
trade deficit at 5 p ercent of GDP,
and international reserves at only
$6.3 billion before the crisis, Brazil’s
cu rren t account deficit is presently
2.4 percent o f GDP, the commercial
deficit stands at only .4 percent of
GDP and international reserves are
estim ated to be as high as $55.4 bil
lion.
More long-term indicators o f the
econom y’s health and the Real
P lan’s viability are the recent surges
in foreign direct investm ent and
export growth. Conservative esti
mates suggest that between $6 and
$7 billion of new foreign direct
investm ent will enter Brazil in 1996,
a substantial increase in com parison
to the last three to four years. An
additional $3 billion will be invested
in the subsidiaries o f m ultinationals
already in the country. A lthough
slow in its im plem entation, the pri
vatization process has recently gen
erated new foreign investm ent with
the sale o f Rio de Jan e iro ’s electrici

ty distributor, Light, to an American
firm. T he dem onopolization of pub
lic control over telecom m unications
systems has generated estimates of
over $15-$20 billion of new foreign
investm ent in that sector alone over
the next five years as foreign firms
scramble to take advantage of
Brazil’s large dom estic m arket for
cellular phones, satellite television
and com puter technology. Most
telling o f all for the Real is the fact
that exports, after growing a paltry
2 percent during 1995, grew 10 per
cent in the first half of 1996, a good
predictor o f a trade surplus at year’s
end.
In com parison to these long-term
investments, short-term capital com 
poses a rather m eager source of
finance. Less than 10 p ercent of
foreign reserves depen d on short
term capital; m uch o f this capital
stays in the country three to four
years on average. If these trends
continue, and particularly if the
com m ercial balance does n o t spiral
out o f control into the red, a
Mexico-style collapse will be avoid
ed.
T he Im portance

of

R efo rm s

The most im portant lesson o f the
Mexican exam ple for the Real
P lan’s architects is also the one least
heeded: the need to take concrete
steps to get the fiscal deficit u n d er
control. In this area, Brazilian offi
cials lack both courage and realism
in the face of the country’s prob
lems, many of which are structural
and long-term . T he governm ent’s
piecem eal approach of toying with
gradual devaluations, employing
selective tariffs and raising interest
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rates to contain dom estic dem and,
may prop up the Real Plan in the
short-term , b u t structural adjust
m ents on the size o f public expendi
tures, the ownership and size of
state firms, the massive public pay
roll and the budgets o f state govern
m ents are all necessary to make the
plan successful in the long-term.
O n this point both international
observers such as D ornbusch and
Brazilian economists agree,
although the country’s politicians
have been hesitant to take the
aggressive action recom m ended by
these experts.
Although moving at an overall
slow pace, privatization is a key
structural reform that has been
attem pted in recent years. The
process peaked early when the
F ernando Collor adm inistration ini
tiated the privatization of the state
steel firms, beginning with Usiminas
in 1991. Cosipa, Agominas, Acesita,
and the National Steel Company fol
lowed, along with several other
smaller steel and iron facilities. The
Itam ar Franco adm inistration, how
ever, barely initiated any new privati
zations. D uring his presidential
campaign, Cardoso prom ised to ini
tiate and com plete the privatization
of Brazil’s largest firm , C om panhia
Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), the m in
ing and transportation giant. This
goal was set for 1996, but was
delayed by congress until 1997.
Indeed, only the privatization of Rio
de Ja n e iro ’s Light in May 1996 for
$2.2 billion—m ost of this am ount in
“live” m oney rath er than public
debt issues—reflected the Cardoso
adm inistration's best effort in this
policy area.
Observers are quick to point out
th at practically all of the already pri
vatized firms were “privatizable”—
reasonably productive and potential
ly profitable before they were sold.
By contrast, what lies ahead, with
the exception o f CVRD, are a num 
ber of irreparably unprofitable state
firms, many o f these in the area of

infrastructure. Also, a great deal of
public money, particularly loans at
subsidized rates from the National
Developm ent Bank, was poured into
Usiminas, Acesita and o ther state
firms to restructure them — to make
them m ore productive to eventually
sell them off. Similarly significant
levels o f public expenditures on the
federal road system, the country’s
decrepit ports, and the dilapidated
railroad network are unlikely in the
near future. The alternative of
opening these areas to private con
cessions has only progressed slowly.
Some states like Rio de Janeiro and
Minas Gerais have taken the initia
tive by granting concessions on state
and m unicipal roads and ports,
often as part of an infrastructure
loan with the World Bank, while
national policies continue to stall in
congress.
T he probabilities that privatiza
tion will rescue Brazil’s decaying
infrastructure are not good.
Foreign firms are wary of venturing
into this area since Brasilia has yet
to regulate the process of granting
public concessions. Thus far,
investors have shown prim ary inter
est in either the already profitable
steel production and energy distrib
ution com panies or high-tech sec
tors with prom ising dom estic m ar
kets like telecom m unications sys
tems.
Getting the fiscal deficit u n d er
control also m eans cutting expendi
tures at the state and federal levels
on the expansive and redundant
civil service. Spending on the feder
al civil service constituted 74 per
cent of federal tax receipts (exclud
ing receipts transferred to the states
and cities) in 1992. T he 1988
Constitution m ade wholesale dis
missals in the civil service extremely
difficult to im plem ent, and recent
attem pts to reform the Magna Carta
in this area have m et with stiff resis
tance from different political groups
as diverse as the conservative gover
nors from the N ortheast and the

leftist labor unions. Thus far, such
reform s are stuck in congress,
although some state governm ents
have had some success. Minas
Gerais recently reduced its public
payroll by providing incentive plans
for voluntary retirem ent.
Federal and state tax receipts have
increased over the last three years as
a result of the m odernization o f tax
collection agencies and the prosecu
tion o f tax evasion. Yet the tax sys
tem is still too chaotic and ineffi
cient. Each state governm ent, for
example, may set its own tax rates
on com m erce o f goods and services,
creating extra costs for businesses
wishing to conduct interstate com 
m erce in states with higher tax
rates. Attem pts to create a m ore
nationally unified tax system contin
ue to draw m uch attention in
Brasilia, bu t significant steps have
yet to be taken.
A m ore im m ediate problem is the
financial system which has suffered
from a wave o f bankruptcies that
followed the governm ent’s hike in
interest rates (during the Mexico
crisis) to exorbitant levels. Spreads
of 65 p ercent and 90 percent have
been a com m on occurrence. As a
result, a num ber of Brazil’s largest
banks threatened to collapse. In
response, the Cardoso adm inistra
tion created PROER, a public bail
out program for prom oting finan
cial m ergers and restructuring.
Despite a significant com m itm ent of
$13 billion during the first seven
m onths o f PROER’s existence, con
fidence in Brazilian banks continues
to flag. Already larger and m ore
costly bail-outs are required to save
key banks. BANESPA, the state bank
o f Sao Paulo, was recently bailed out
o f its close to $10 billion debt.
Banco Nacional, a large private
bank fraught with cases of fraud, is
currently negotiating a $6.7 billion
bail-out. W hatever the success of
PROER in rescuing the financial sys
tem, paying for this program will be
a challenge. Dealing with the weight
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three
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of these expenditures on the state’s
fiscal budget deficit over the course
o f the next few years will dem and
significant structural reform s now.
T he com bination of a large influx
of dollars during the Real Plan and
increasing public expenditures has
already generated an internal debt
crisis to rival the external debt crisis
of the 1980s. T he use o f the public
debt in the im plem entation of m on
etary policy, privatization and finan
cial reform has created an internal
debt estim ated at $150 billion. If
structural reform s are not im ple
m ented soon, the full weight of this
debt may cause faith in the Real to
soon crum ble.
E l im in a t in g

the

“ B r a zil C o s t ”

T he Real Plan may have provided
firm s with stable prices with which
to do business, but it also created
added pressures to adjust to m ore
competitive global markets. The
overvalued Real forced many
exporters to reduce labor costs by
downsizing their staff, m odernizing
their plant and equipm ent, and
increasing the productivity of their
workers and their links with suppli
ers. Firms able to adjust to the new
term s o f trade could make the tran
sition. Most firms, however, shrunk
significantly or collapsed before the
double hit o f the Reals overvalua
tion and the high interest rates that
the plan required.
R ecent developm ents in the auto
parts sector highlight the trouble
dom estic firms have had in adjust
ing to global com petition. The
trade balance for Brazilian auto
parts fell from a surplus o f $1.4
billion in 1989 to $500 m illion in
1995. Em ployment decreased by
30,000 jobs at the beginning o f 1995
as firms scram bled to reduce their
p roduction costs. Meanwhile, the
high cost o f capital produced a sig
nificant drop in imports: from 16
p ercen t to 2 p ercent during the
Real Plan. T he result was the clo
sure of dozens o f auto parts firms
14 Hemisphere
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and large buy outs o f the most pro
ductive Brazilian firms by m ultina
tionals possessing m ore advanced
technology and access to capital. In
Ju n e 1996, Metal Leve, the crown
jewel of Brazilian auto parts, was
purchased by the G erm an giant
M ahle in association with its dom es
tic com petitor, Cofap.
For firms in auto parts, textiles,
footwear, and o ther industrial sec
tors, the costs of doing business in
Brazil— the so-called Brazil cost with
all its in h eren t inefficiencies (poor
infrastructure, prolonged down
time, untrained labor and lack of
access to technology and capital) —
required significant restructuring of
production and em ploym ent. Most
firms have reduced their production
and labor costs and have boosted
their productivity. The average
industrial firm after 1992 increased
its productivity 7 percent.
A lthough salaries increased
approxim ately 30 percent during
the Real Plan, total em ploym ent
dropped. O ne indicator of the
immensity o f this restructuring is
the fact that the Brazilian economy
currently produces 31 p ercent m ore
than it did four years ago but the
economy employs fewer people.
Estimates o f unem ploym ent in the
G reater Sao Paulo area often reach
16-18 percent, despite increasing
econom ic activity.
T he process o f productive restruc
turing m ight well have been
inevitable with trade liberalization,
but the Real Plan certainly acceler
ated the restructuring process and
m ade it m ore difficult for most
firms to cope with the changes.
This point reveals significant limita
tions in the Cardoso governm ent’s
approach on the economy. By rely
ing almost com pletely on m acroeco
nom ic policy, the adm inistration has
been late in realizing how the Real
Plan has affected the economy.
R ecent concerns o f avoiding a
Mexico-like crisis and reversing
politically troubling unem ploym ent

rates have only led to additional
piecem eal measures. For example,
the National Developm ent Bank
created in Ju n e 1996 a series of
financial program s to prom ote
exports and is currently studying
the possibilities o f a national finan
cial system for small- and medium size firms to increase em ploym ent.
E v a l u a t io n : L e s s o n s L e a r n e d ?

T he m ain lesson from the first
two years o f the Real Plan is that
there is m ore to stabilizing an econ
omy’s growth than bringing down
inflation. A few years ago, a relative
ly low rate of inflation would have
satisfied most Brazilians, but now,
increasingly larger num bers o f busi
nesses, labor unions and consum er
organizations are dem anding gov
ern m en t action to alleviate structur
al problem s such as unem ploym ent,
the high cost o f capital and the
inadequacy of infrastructure.
Dealing with these problem s
requires a state capable of interven
ing in the economy, and in Brazil,
such a state requires the constitu
tional and administrative reform s
that policy makers and politicians
seem so reluctant to tackle. Added
to these problem s is the m acroeco
nom ic necessity o f keeping the Real
on the path of a gradual devalua
tion. This option will help exports
and consequently growth, but m ore
diversified policy responses are
needed to address unem ploym ent
and the problem s o f the financial
system.
In the end, D ornbusch’s criticism
o f the Real Plan is a welcomed
w arning that shocked Brazilian poli
cy makers and society into evaluat
ing the choices they have m ade d u r
ing the last two years. The warning
signaled that everything was n o t all
right simply because inflation
rem ained low. Disaster may n o t be
around the corner, but if the
reform s are not im plem ented soon,
D ornbusch's prem onition may
come true. ■
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Back to Basics
Leonardo Ferreira

s the second oldest democracy
of Latin America in “clear and
present danger” of destruc
tion? Novelist Tom Clancy
and the US governm ent would
assumedly answer ‘apparently.’
O n March 1, 1996, eight m onths
before the US presidential vote, the
White House decertified Colombia
as an uncooperative state in the war
against drugs, as a republic where
even its president is at the mercy of
drug cartels by accepting payments
of up to six million dollars in the last
election (1994).
Colombians are not living through
another Violencia, the conflict which
caused a m inim um of 200,000 deaths
following World War II. As a precau
tion against violence, recent adminis
trations have banned live broadcasts
of terrorist and subversive acts
including com m uniques and inter
views with narcotraffickers or guerril
la groups. Yet, a democracy such as
Colombia, weak and in fear, needs
remedies far from m edia controls,
beyond sweeping legal reforms or
presidential recalls. Colombia
requires—deserves—a fresh social
agenda stemming from the effective
protection of fundam ental liberties
and prerogatives.

I

In S earch

of

S a lv a tio n

For two decades, to paraphrase
Archbishop Pedro Rubiano, drug
corruption was an “elephant”—
Colom bia’s adopted symbol for dis
honesty—sitting supposedly unde
tected in the presidential palace’s
foyer. How could a retired army

Leonardo Ferreira is an assistant profes
sor at the School of Communication of
the University of Miami.
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sergeant amass a one-billion-dollar
fortune without being suspected of
narcotrafficking? Thousands of
Colombians, particularly m em bers of
the elite, contributed to the moral
erosion of the country by profiting
from drug proceeds. As President
Samper acknowledges, “Let’s not be
hypocrites. This society went about
tolerating drug trafficking in such a
way that what we need is an escape
for all of us, not just for m e.”
Presidential candidate Alvaro
Gomez proposed in 1990 a “National
Salvation M ovement.” After being
kidnapped by the guerrilla and
defeated in three presidential elec
tions, Gomez insisted that Colombia
was ill and in need of radical reform.
O n November 2, 1995, he was assassi
nated.
Colombian society has been histor
ically shaped by arm ed conflicts. To
understand its character, it is essen
tial to examine the relationship
between political unrest and hum an
rights.
T h e R ig h t

to

L ive

There are no definite num bers on
the casualties of Colombia’s drug
war. Colonel Jose Leonardo Gallego,
director of the antinarcotics police,
has revealed that over 8,400 individu
als fell victims to drug terrorism in
the last decade. Forty percent of
these individuals were m urdered,
including one m inister of justice,
one attorney general, four presiden
tial candidates (notably, Luis Carlos
Galan in 1989), eighteen magistrates,
fifteen judges, hundreds of police
officers, public officials, party mili
tants, and civilians.
Journalist Maria Jim ena Duzan,
author of an authoritative book on
drug cartels, calculates her hom e

land’s sacrifice at 60,000 lives in the
second half of the 1980s. A CBS sta
tion in Miami estimates the country’s
death toll at nearly 45,000 people,
and Latin American Guide claims
there were 30,050 assassinations in
this Andean state between 1993-94.
No one really knows how many peo
ple have died in the so-called
Colombian drug war.
Foreign com m entators attribute
this violence to the “aggressive”
habits of Colombians, primarily radi
cal politics and drug trafficking. For
these com m entators, the form er
“South American A thens”—Santafe
de Bogota—may very well be “the
most dangerous city on earth.”
Colombians reject, even resent this
behavior label as simplistic and dis
criminatory, recognizing narcotraf
ficking as the source of most hum an
rights crimes, primarily m urder and
kidnapping.
T h e R ig h t

to

P eace

The last Colombian constitutional
convention concluded that there is
no democracy without harmony. On
July 5, 1991, the new ‘Magna Carta’
com m anded every citizen to work
for peace and the protection of fun
dam ental rights as the basis for toler
ance and coexistence.
Five years into the enactm ent of
the new constitution, however, target
ed killings, kidnapping, and other
forms of aggression continue. In
1995, H um an Rights Watch con
dem ned Colombia as a nom inal
democracy where torture remains a
daily reality, im punity is the rule, and
“disposable” people (street children,
homosexuals, and beggars) are m ur
dered in “social-cleansing orgies” by
paramilitary squads often linked to
the military.
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The one message—basic rights!

It took drug cartels, death squads,
sicarios (hired criminals), guerrillas,
and narcopolitical and military con
spirators less than a decade to push
Colombia down a slope of death,
corruption, and lawlessness. Anyone
could be killed or kidnapped.
Cripton TV news director Diana
Turbay, for instance, daughter of for
m er president Julio Cesar Turbay
(1978-82), was n o t as lucky as Juan
Carlos Gaviria, brother of OAS
Secretary General Cesar Gaviria,
who was kidnapped and miraculous
ly freed thanks to Fidel Castro’s
intervention. Soon after Cesar
Gaviria assumed the Colombian
presidency, Diana Turbay was killed
while being rescued in a crossfire
between the police and the
Extraditables, the squadron set up by
Pablo Escobar. Noticia de un Secuestro
(News of a K idnapping), GarciaM arquez’s latest book, describes this
tragic episode as the “bestial dram a”
lived by Colombians for m ore than
twenty years.
Fr eedo m

of

E x p r e s s io n

Days before chief editor Raul
Echavarria of Cali’s Occidente was
assassinated in Septem ber 1986,
Guillerm o Cano of El Espectador
deplored the “narcotized state of
public opinion.” After m ounting a
strong defense o f extradition as a
com pelling instrum ent against drug
cartels, Cano was m achine-gunned,
in D ecem ber 1986, in front of his
daily, the oldest newspaper in
Colombia. O n Septem ber 2, 1989,
the Extraditables tried to literally kill
C ano’s El Espectador by igniting a car
bom b next to the new spaper’s build
ing in Bogota. Yet, virtually
destroyed, the newspaper never
stopped printing.

Cano is only one of many m edia
martyrs. Duzan estimates that 70
reporters were m urdered between
1986-91. O ne night in 1982, while
working for El Espectador, Maria
Jimena Duzan survived a m idnight
dynamite explosion. Sylvia, her
younger sister, was not as fortunate.
O n February 26, 1990, on assign
m ent for a British TV docum entary
in a guerrilla town, Sylvia Duzan and
three peasant leaders were killed by
param ilitary m en including an offduty police officer. According to the
Inter-American Press Association,
out of 144 journalists m urdered in
the Americas between 1988-93, 57
died in Colombia.
U nder pressure, despite powerful
incentives to look the o ther way,
Colombian journalists m aintain a
brave front to keep their audiences
inform ed. In this struggle, Article 20
o f the 1991 Constitution plays a piv
otal role, guaranteeing everyone’s
liberty to express thoughts and opin
ions (including the right to disclose
and receive truthful and impartial
inform ation). Indeed, the new con
stitution defines com m unication as a
competitive, participatory, and
socially responsible activity. A chap
ter on social, economic, and cultural
rights also intends to “protect” the
freedom and independence of the
journalism profession. Old notions
of public order, social morality, and
state of em ergency have, at least on
paper, given way to ideas of popular
freedom , impartiality, and fairness.
The Suprem e C ourt decides what
this rhetoric m eans in practice. For
years, social responsibility has been
an attractive but disappointing theo
ry in Colombia, inasm uch as there
are no guidelines on when and how
reporters are deem ed responsible.

In an overly commercialized envi
ronm ent, defam ation is a crime and
its defense lim ited when com pared
to systems where libel is a civil mat
ter. News on social issues are
exem pted, but m edia organizations
m ust prove the truthfulness of their
assertions. Public officials and pub
lic figures regularly force the press
to retract statem ents without having
to prove actual malice. Sometimes
news organizations com plain about
authorities being “too tolerant with
[critics], letting them do and say
whatever they w ant.” Unfortunately,
freedom of expression for many
Colombians is still a privilege, not a
right.
S o c ia l P a r t ic ip a t io n

The new constitution introduced
notions o f utm ost im portance for
the country such as the P eople’s
D efender (O m budsm an), the
Fiscalia (to fight back im punity), the
Constitutional Court, and limitations
on the power o f presidents to
declare em ergencies— thus ending
the pernicious “state of siege” of pre
vious decades. O ther revolutionary
concepts were also introduced to the
Colombian legal system. These ele
m ents included the p eo p le’s right to
receive im partial inform ation and to
take tutela action (guarding funda
m ental rights), the legality o f a dual
citizenship, and basic econom ic and
cultural am enities such as the right
to live in a healthy environm ent.
Legal reform s rarely bring instant
change—if at all. The unequal dis
tribution of wealth, the increasing
gap between the rich and the poor,
the lack of basic needs, and the per
sistent climate of violence against
children are huge barriers to the
participatory society the 1991
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Constitution envisions. Access to fun
dam ental domains such as inform a
tion, education, technology, and the
arts is shrinking rather than expand
ing. As with freedom of the press,
there has been little advancem ent in
social participation.
A first wave of privatization gave
the wrong impression that Colombia
was better off. Im provements, if any,
have hardly reached the needy. In
his inaugural speech. President
Sam per vowed a Pacto Social whereby
special attention will be paid to the
poor. W ithin a few days, the
“Contract with Colom bia” was
reduced to a series o f scandals
involving the president himself.
Colombia has shown a preference
for a modus vivendi typified by aggra
vated levels of socioeconomic con
centration, speculation, m onopoliza
tion, intolerance and discrimination.
T he law of the jungle has taken over
the country’s ethics.
S elf -D e t e r m in a t io n

Sovereignty, the people’s right to
secure their own future free from
external interference, is a fervent
issue in Colombia. In fact, self-deter
m ination seems m ore and m ore
im portant insofar as num erous
Colombians feel politically, econom i
cally, and even ethnically discrimi
nated by the industrialized world.
The US decertification, the constant
threat of US commercial sanctions,
and the repeated harassm ent of
Colombian nationals at
U S /E uropean embassies and ports
of entry have heightened the senti
m ent o f anti-imperialism against
world powers, particularly the
U nited States.
President Clinton, who has never
set foot in the Americas in spite of
the “Miami spirit” of the 1994 sum
mit, has a policy towards Latin
America as unpredictable as
Colom bia’s im m ediate future. In the
m eantim e, Colombians watch the
news. A 1996 national survey by the
US D epartm ent of Health showed
Hemisphere • Volume Sei’eu, Number Three

that use of cocaine, LSD, and mari
ju an a am ong teenagers rose a 105
percent between 1992-95. Public
broadcasters report that cocaine is as
easy to get as a pint of Haagen-Dazs
ice cream or a pack of M arlboros in
N orth America. Self-determination is
a touchy issue in the A ndean region,
largely because of the First World
rhetoric about the war on narcotics.
In N eed

of

A c t io n

Respect for life and peace m ust be
the priority for any dem ocratic
progress in Colombia. This country
needs a serious peace plan imple
m enting a lasting cease-fire, an open
amnesty with the guerrilla and the
paramilitary, and a reform of the
arm ed forces and the justice system.
While protecting its national sover
eignty, Colombia should improve
both its image and relations with the
North. Therefore, Colombians must
repeal the prohibition on nonextra
dition o f nationals. Respect for inter
national law is imperative if the goal

is to dem and com m itted action from
other countries against illegal drugs.
Colombia could internationalize this
problem by placing arrested drug
traffickers in the hands of the U.N.
and other multilateral bodies. If nec
essary, world drug tribunals ought to
be created giving narcotrafficking
the rank of a crime against hum ani
ty.
H um an rights in Colombia also
m eans the obligation to guarantee
safe and ample freedom of expres
sion, particularly the right to criti
cize governm ent officials without
intim idation. The social responsibili
ty of the press cannot be an excuse
to censor speech. In the end, the key
towards resolving this country’s
social problem s lies in the right of
the im poverished to participate in
society. Decisive action against
absolute poverty is the only way out
of the dilemmas o f this hem isphere.
Colombians need com petent action
to safeguard their basic hum an
rights. ■
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One Step Forward, Ten Steps Back
Gerardo Gonzalez

uban society is facing a
doses of foreign investment.) The
very com plex econom ic
recovery had three o ther im portant
and political situation.
dimensions: a significant increase
T he events surround
in exports (20 percent); the stabi
ing the February 24,
lization of the exchange rate rela
1996
downing of two
tive to the US dollar; and, the
civilian aircraft and the subsequent
reduction of the fiscal deficit to 3.6
ann o u n cem en t from the Com
percent o f GDP.
m unist Party politburo o f a new ide
The transform ation occurring in
ological offensive, com plicated the
Cuban society is a result o f a strate
dom estic scene at a time when sev
gy to confront the im pact o f a crisis.
eral factors augured a m ore propi
These changes are incipient but in
tious framework for a transition on
the mid- to long-term , they will sig
the island. Such a transition point
nify a new econom ic and social
ed toward an econom ic and politi
restructuring of the island. The
cal restructuring with different char
presence of foreign investm ent in
acteristics from the prevailing struc
the m ost dynamic sectors of the
ture.
econom y produced substantial
changes in the way in which modes
O n e S tep F orw ard
of production, distribution and con
T he econom ic results of 1995 and
sum ption are organized. These
a “softening” in the relations with
changes have had grave repercus
the US were two positive factors
sions in o ther sectors o f the national
which could pave the way for future
economy, forced to seek in tern a
change. While it is prem ature to
tionally competitive levels and to
state that the C uban economy has
acquire the same technological and
en tered into a phase o f sustained
organizational patterns prevalent in
recovery, the results thus far have
the m ixed and private sectors. A
dem onstrated that the downward
significant im pact has been felt in
spiral has been halted. In contrast
the productive m atrix which will
to the weak econom ic growth of
imply m ajor shifts in the n ature of
1994, which was basically inflation
the productive sector. First, state
ary and driven by the recovery of a
adm inistrators will have to adapt to
few nonproductive services, the 2.5
the m arket-oriented culture brought
p ercent growth rate achieved in
in by foreign investors and will have
1995 was m ore impressive. This
to forego state paternalism — adm in
growth rate was largely the result of
istrators could derive a greater share
significant increases in productive
o f power due to their contacts with
sectors such as nickel (64.4 per
the world m arket. Second, labor
cent), tobacco (52 percent), and
relations in all state enterprises will
steel (45.7 percent). (These sectors
also undergo a severe transform a
have benefited from im portant
tion. As a result, a contradiction
has developed due to the state’s
requirem ent o f high levels o f capital
Gerardo Gonzalez is a professor of
accum ulation and labor intensive
Economics at the Universidad
technological and productivity
Interamericana of Puerto Rico.
norms.
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Such a scenario inevitably implies
the appearance o f new conflictive
areas and the shifting of power quo
tas to the em erging entrepreneurial
elite. As a consequence, it also
implies the obsolescence o f many
m echanisms, practices, and partici
pation arrangem ents that character
ized the previous paternalistic
scheme. Thus, there will be a need
to develop a process of adjustm ent
and institutional developm ent capa
ble not only o f dealing with these
contradictions but also of em power
ing workers with m echanisms in
tune with the new reality.
The adoption of m arket norm s
has im plied a cardinal variation
from the rules of the game that
guided the Cuban econom y and
society for m ore than three decades.
U nder the socialist project, the state
played a highly centralized role
based on the notion that only the
central governm ent—possessing a
national perspective of the prob
lems and arm ed with vast financial
assets—was capable of protecting all
social interests and achieving the
principal national objectives which
included: creating a basic infrastruc
ture; developing key sectors of the
economy; guaranteeing social jus
tice; and ensuring national in d ep en 
dence.
While these considerations were
justified at certain historical
m om ents, the adoption o f uniform
m easures to carry out national
objectives did not necessarily satisfy
the dem ands o f distinct social sec
tors. As a result, these sectors were
totally subordinated to the central
governm ent.
With the onslaught o f the crisis,
state prerogatives and decision-mak
ing capacity becam e restricted by
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In the clutches of the past

the dram atic scarcity o f resources,
which severely penalized the inter
ests and necessities o f the social sec
tors that d ep en d ed on the state. In
this context, the 1993 reform s
placed the m arket in open com peti
tion with the state as the source for
the redistribution of incom e,
resources, and place o f survival. As
a result, im p o rtan t segm ents of the
population enjoyed a relative liber
alization from state tutelage as they
resorted to the m arket in search of
econom ic roles and resources that
the state could no longer deliver.
O n the political front, the state
was also forced to make conces
sions. With the collapse o f the
socialist camp and the precipitation
o f the econom ic crisis, the ideologi
cal dogm as that sustained the gov
ern m e n t began to crum ble—as did
the capacity o f the Com m unist Party
to exercise control. Thus, in Cuban
society, a gradual clam or for a
“socialization” o f power and for a
forum for political debate began to
develop. C uba’s leadership attem pt
ed to abort or prevent these social
dem ands from playing a role in
state institutions. To the govern
m en t’s dismay, a period of rich pub
lic debate em erged as of 1990 thus
becom ing an “inform al m arketplace
of d ebate.” O ne of the m ost signifi
cant m om ents came during the dis
cussion for the convocation o f the
Fourth Party Congress. Thousands
o f proposals were m ade, revealing
the plurality o f opinions that could
be found in Cuba in the early 1990s.
T he vocalization o f dem ands was
also the result o f the m aturation of
a ‘social subject’ who had a high
participation potential but was
trapped in an institutional arrange
m ent th at frustrated the accum ulat

A cartoon from a Cuban newspaper, Juventud Rebelde. The caption reads, “I ’m
renting it to some foreigners.” T he snail is referring to his shell, o f course.

ed political energy. By the 1990s,
Cuban society had experienced radi
cal changes. T he m ost noteworthy
included: substantial increases in
schooling levels; the entry into pub
lic life of new generations whose
socialization process differed
markedly from previous ones; the
incorporation o f a highly qualified,
technical and professional female
workforce; notable increases in
urbanization; and an intense
process of politization and political
m aturation. Moreover, nearly onethird o f the voting age population
was b o rn after 1959; nearly twofifths o f the labor force was female;
and almost one m illion persons had
com pleted university and technical
studies and were professionally

em ployed in production, service,
and public adm inistration sectors.
In short, C uban society had u n d er
gone a process o f “autonom ization”
which was evident in the expression
of positions that sometimes conflict
ed with official dictates. Also, there
has been an em ergence of new eco
nom ic actors (e.g., en trepreneurial
technocrats linked to the world m ar
ket and self-employed workers)
whose m edium - and long-term
interests are no t necessarily com pat
ible with the socialist project—
future political tensions could arise.
Beginning in 1993, these changes
were anchored to the course o f USCuba relations. T he Clinton adm in
istration’s decision to modify tradi
tional im m igration policy regarding
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three
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Cuban immigrants, its initial inten
tion to veto the Helms-Burton Bill,
and the decision to im plem ent the
Torricelli Law’s Track Two provision,
implied a significant change in the
treatm ent of Cuba. The new policy
rejected confrontation and became
one o f "bridge building.” If one
considers seriously rum ors regarding
the possibility of bolder actions
toward Cuba during C linton’s sec
ond term , the arrival of a period of
slackening of tensions would sup
p o rt econom ic reform and strength
en Cuban civil society.
T e n Steps B ack

C uban leadership was not oblivi
ous to the socioeconomic transfor
m ation and its political and ideologi
cal costs. However, it reacted slowly
to direct the transform ation. It was
n o t a coincidence that the reform s
were delayed despite the fact that
the econom ic situation dem anded a
transform ation of the system. Re
forms were allowed only when the
crisis reached a point where the gov
ern m en t was losing the ability to
govern (as exemplified by the events
o f the Sum m er o f 1994). A bold
step might have been a policy to
propose a new developm ent strategy
based on the requirem ents for eco
nom ic efficiency (including institu
tional, procedural and normative
reform s in the political sphere).
O ne o f the conditions to resolve the
severe econom ic crisis may be to
search for some coherence between
the political and econom ic spheres.
The objective would be to resolve
the contradictions which spring
from the econom ic transform ation.
C uba’s political leadership, however,
has elected against innovative eco
nom ic change and the introduction
of political reforms. Instead, it has
confronted current and future polit
ical trends with traditional m echa
nisms. Such a choice is not strange
to a leadership which has always
stressed ideological supremacy over
o th er factors.
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The decision to block tolerance
and autonom ous action—which
had been allowed in recent years
because of the Revolution’s internal
and external weaknesses and less as
a result o f a will for change—was
taken when the course o f US for
eign policy moved in concert with
dom estic events. In my view, the
catalyst was the decision on the part
of dissident groups to form a single
organization nam ed Concilio Cubano
and the announcem ent of February
24, 1996, as the launching date.
The US move toward reconciliation
was perceived by C uba’s leadership
as an assault on its traditional power
base. In this sense, it is worth no t
ing that the Revolution constructed
its dom estic and international policy
based on the notion o f “fortress
u n d er siege” which m andated the
need to protect national security
and which served to justify political
intolerance and stringent control
measures. U nder a nonconfronta
tion scenario with the U nited States,
the absence o f the traditional pop
ular mobilization elem ent would
force C uba’s leadership to deal with
a novel political situation. It was
advantageous for C uba’s leaders to
continue living u n d er the tense situ
ation that has characterized rela
tions with its n o rth ern neighbor—at
least until these leaders elim inate
or control internal political discon
tent. As a result, the shooting down
of the two airplanes on February
24, 1996, was a calculated political
decision by the C uban governm ent
to unravel the Clinton adm inistra
tio n ’s intentions to seek closer ties
with Cuba. T he incident also pro
vided an excuse to flame nationalist
sentim ent and launch the “ideologi
cal offensive” Fidel Castro
announced before the C entral
Com m ittee.
The ann o u n cem en t o f this offen
sive signified a regression— ten
steps back—in the political life of
the island. In 1986, a Process of
Rectification was initiated u n d er a

different context; however, it herald
ed what would occur a decade later.
T he Process o f Rectification was
born with a high ideological con
tent. Its central argum ent, to rescue
“to national," found a fertile ground
in the popular patriotic sentim ent
fueled by hostile US postures and by
the pro-capitalist trends in Eastern
E urope and the Soviet Union.
Rectification was explained n o t only
as the only genuine socialist alterna
tive (given the capitulation of for
m er allies), bu t also as the only
alternative through which the
Cuban nation could guarantee its
survival. Now as then, the argu
m ents o f the Cuban governm ent are
similar.
F u t u r e P e r sp e c t iv e

C uban events and change are
always likely to generate controversy
and a nu m b er o f interpretations.
This essay has only provided a par
tial interpretation o f the contradic
tory transform ation that unfolded—
and will continue to unfold in Cuba.
Many questions rem ain unanswered;
perhaps the m ost relevant is
w hether the events o f 1996 will
abort any possibility of a transition
on the island.
Given the complexity o f the situa
tion, only a few clues on C uba’s
future can be provided which may
be significant in any scenario. An
im portant prem ise m ust be noted.
Despite the governm ent’s claims
that m easures aim ed at com bating
the crisis are tem porary, these have
defined, and will continue to
define, a Cuban reality that will be
difficult to revert.
In the short- and m edium -term ,
progress will depend on three dis
tinct factors: the form that the
m uch announced ideological offen
sive will take; the econom ic results
obtained in 1996, especially the
sugar harvest; and the policy that
the reelected Clinton adm inistra
tion adopts in the n ear future
toward Cuba. ■

C uba n R esearch I n s t it u t e
FLORIDA

INTERNATIONAL

UNIVERSITY

presents

T he F irst C R I C o nferenc e o n C u b a n a n d C u b a n -A m e r ic a n St u d ie s
October 9 -11,1997

CALL FOR PAPERS
The Cuban Research Institute (CRI) of Florida International University invites all those per
sons engaged in Cuban or Cuban-American Studies to participate in the CRI's first general
conference, to be held at the FIU campus O ctober 9-11,1997.
We encourage the submission of proposals for papers, panels, and roundtables in all areas
o f intellectual inquiry relevant to an understanding o f the history, culture, society, and cre
ative expressions of the Cuban nation. Through this conference, the CRI seeks to convene
a broad gathering that bridges geographic, generational, ideological, and disciplinary
boundaries.
The fo llo w in g areas are meant to be suggestive o f the broad scope of the conference: the
developm ent of the social, cultural, political, and econom ic institutions of the island dur
ing the colonial and Republican eras; the antecedents and consequences o f the
Revolution o f 1959; analysis of the contem porary Cuban reality; manifestations of national
identity in the arts, literature, and popular culture; migration and the dynamics of Cuban
com m unities outside the island; Cuba-U.S. relations; and the importance o f race, class,
gender, and political culture in the developm ent of the Cuban nation, both on the island
and in its diaspora.
Persons interested in participating should submit a detailed one-page abstract of the paper
they propose to present. We also accept proposals from those w ho wish to organize pan
els and roundtables.
The CRI w ill offer a lim ited number of modest travel grants to graduate students and junior
scholars w ho w ould otherwise not be able to attend the conference. Indication of interest
and need for such support should be submitted w ith the abstract.
Deadline for the submission o f abstracts is A p ril 3 0 ,1 9 9 7 .
For

more information or to send your abstract, contact :

Lisandro Perez, Director
Cuban Research Institute
D M 363, University Park
Florida International University
M iam i, FL 33199
(305) 348-1991/Fax (305) 348-3593
crinst@servms. fiu.edu

Reports: The Am ericas

Perspectives on Regional Trade
Thom as M . Leonard

o u r University o f N orth
Florida professors,1who
recently com pleted a twoyear study u n d e r the aus
pices o f a grant from the
U nited States D epartm ent
o f Education, concluded that the
“o p en in g ” o f Cuba will have a
greater im pact upon the C aribbean
com m unity than the N orth
Am erican Free Trade A greem ent
(NAFTA). F u rtherm ore, intraregional com m ercial relations are
m ore im p o rtan t to the South
A m erican countries than NAFTA.
W hen Congress passed—and
President William J. Clinton
signed— the NAFTA agreem ent in
late 1993, there was widespread
concern o f its potential dam age to
the U nited States economy. Little
attention was given in the US to the
possible im pact that NAFTA m ight
have u p o n the C aribbean and
South A m erican countries.
A lthough the C aribbean C om m un
ity and C om m on M arket (CARICOM) established a series o f com 
missions to study the issue, the
S outhern Cone Com m on M arket
(MERCOSUR) countries only start
ed an exam ination o f NAFTA’s sig
nificance to the region in 1996.
As p art o f the project, the team
visited th ree CARICOM countries
(Barbados, Belize and the D om ini
can Republic) and the four MER
COSUR countries (Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay).
W ith the exception o f A rgentina,
the U nited States embassy staff in

F
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each country provided the team
with an introductory briefing on
the n atio n ’s contem porary econo
my and politics, followed by inter
views with personnel in various gov
e rn m e n t m inistries, private
research organizations, and m em 
bers o f the business sector.
T h e C a r ib b e a n C o m m u n i t y

T he origins of CARICOM can be
traced to 1973 w hen several form er
British colonies agreed to establish
a free trade area. Since then CARI
COM has grown into a regional
association representing 15 nations
with the m andate to deal with intraC aribbean and global trade.
T he CARICOM nations visited by
the team were selected because of
their econom ic differences:
Barbados has the best m anaged
econom y in the C aribbean com m u
nity, Belize seeks to secure its
future as the m ost recently inde
p e n d e n t C aribbean nation and, the
D om inican Republic holds a special
relationship with the U nited States
“807” industries. Despite the diver
sity, each shares com m on concerns
about its econom ic future.
Barbados and Belize are form er
British colonies that profit from
two im p o rtan t legacies: a literate
population an d a functioning
dem ocratic form o f governm ent.
In contrast, the D om inican
R epublic has a Spanish tradition
and since its in d ep en d en ce in 1844
has been m arred by a series o f dic
tatorships. Each also shares a histo
ry of governm ent serving elitist
interests. This legacy has been suc
cessfully challenged in Barbados
and is now being challenged in
Belize and the Dom inican
Republic. Clearly, these traditions

provide guidance for the future,
and bespeak that Barbados is the
m ost confident o f the three, Belize
less so and the D om inican Republic
the least confident.
Only the D om inican Republic
anticipates an adverse im pact upon
its econom y as a result o f the
NAFTA accords. T he R epublic is
hom e to 17 Free Trade Zones
where num erous US electric, gar
m ent and pharm aceutical plants
operate u n d e r “807” status.
A ccording to this arrangem ent,
parts are shipped to the Dom inican
R epublic for assembly an d re tu rn ed
to the US duty-free or n ea r so.
W ith NAFTA, D om inican officials
expect th at there will be no future
expansion of these operations, but
ra th e r that new US investm ents in
assembly plants will go to Mexico
where wages and transportation
costs are m uch lower. The
B arbadian governm ent does not
share the D om inicans’ concern
because it views NAFTA as address
ing an econom y o f the past.
Instead, Barbados anticipates that
its future rests n o t with m anufactur
ing bu t with inform atics, telecom 
m unications and offshore financial
services. Belizean officials do n o t
anticipate th at NAFTA will have an
adverse im pact upon its economy,
save for the trucking industry
which delivers goods from the
w harf at Belize City to businesses in
the Yucatan region o f so u th ern
Mexico and the western b o rd e r of
Guatem ala. O therw ise, m ore press
ing needs lay in agricultural devel
op m en t (to cut the im portation of
foodstuffs) and the developm ent of
a labor force to m eet the needs of
light industrial produ ctio n and an
expanded tourist industry.
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CARICOM, MERCOSUR and NAFTA revisited

T he pro p o sed G raham -G ibbons
Bill in the U n ited States Congress
does n o t excite spokespersons in
all th ree countries. This bill offers
to ex ten d NAFTA’s trade agree
m ents to the C aribbean com m uni
ty, b u t with the potential dem an d
for p relim inary agreem ents on
intellectual pro p erty rights, govern
m en t p ro c u rem en t policies and
offshore banking, allegations have
arisen o f US in terferen ce in the
in tern al affairs o f o th e r nations.
If NAFTA does n o t arouse m uch
in terest in these countries, the
an ticipated “o p e n in g ” o f C uba
does. All th ree advocate the lifting
o f th e US em bargo against Cuba,
viewing the em bargo as an
im m oral act th at contributes to the
suffering o f the C uban people
w ithout b ringing political change
to th e island. Despite this position,
two countries— th e D om inican
R epublic and Belize— adm ittedly
stand to lose should C uba “open
u p .” B oth the D om inicans an d the
Belizeans anticipate a loss for the
tourist industries. Curiosity would
cause visitors to flock to Cuba
despite the D om inican R epublic’s
well-established tourist industry
an d Belize’s special place on the
Mundo Maya ro ute. T he D om ini
cans and Belizeans also fear
C uban com petition in citrus and
sugar exports and for dollar invest
m ent. (The D om inican R epublic’s
tobacco in d ustry m ight also be
jeo p ard ized .) In contrast, the
B arbadians stand m uch m ore con
fidently since they anticipate an
increase in tourism because their
location at the far en d o f the
C aribbean will n o t be lost to cruise
ships stopping at Cuba.
F u rth erm o re, in anticipating a

future in electronic service indus
tries, C uba will not be a com peti
tor.
T he S outh ern C one

MERCOSUR em braces four
so u th ern cone countries—
A rgentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
U ruguay— and has as its goal the
elim ination o f trade barriers
am ong the m em ber countries.
T he econom ies o f these countries
are diverse and at various stages o f
developm ent, with Brazil being the
richest, followed by A rgentina,
U ruguay and Paraguay. Politically,
these countries share the experi
ence o f shedding m ilitary rule and
re tu rn in g to dem ocracy in the
1980s. In fact, Paraguay’s dem oc
racy was reaffirm ed ju s t two days
p rio r to the team ’s arrival in
Asuncion, when an attem pted mili
tary coup was squelched u n d e r US
pressure.
T he NAFTA agreem ent is n o t a
m ajor issue for any o f these co u n 
tries. Instead, officials criticized
the US for its lack o f consistent
policy toward the so u th ern hem i
sphere. In fact, interest in this
region was reignited late in
P resident G eorge B ush’s adm inis
tration after a ten-year lapse.
R eaching an ag reem en t with the
US will be difficult. Like th eir
CARICOM counterparts, the MER
COSUR countries are wary of
W ashington’s insistence on prelim i
nary agreem ents dealing with intel
lectual property rights, p ro cu re
m ent and the environm ent. Each
is also critical o f US tariff p rotec
tion for selected industries and of
the maze o f red tape that confronts
businesspersons seeking access to
the US m arket.

W hile acknow ledging the in flu en 
tial econom ic pow er o f the U nited
States, spokespersons in each
nation em brace the Brazilian p ro 
posal to unite all South Am erica
into one trading partn ersh ip
before dealing with NAFTA an d the
U nited States. Each also accepts
the “four plus o n e ” co ncept w here
by individual MERCOSUR co u n 
tries would conclude agreem ents
with o th er Latin A m erican
republics. Bolivia and Chile jo in e d
MERCOSLTR in mid-1996 on an
associate status. Efforts to expand
MERCOSUR now include
Venezuela, with the ultim ate objec
tive o f uniting MERCOSUR with
the A ndean Com munity, CARI
COM and CACM nations.
If the A ndean nations are looked
u pon favorably as trading p artners,
Chile is viewed with suspicion and
awe. C hile’s failure to en ter
NAFTA was placed at the M exican
‘d o o rstep ’ because Mexico feared
the loss o f its prim ary position as
an extension o f the US economy.
T he decision p ro m p ted the
C hilean governm ent to look toward
MERCOSUR. Most believe that
Chile will w ant to pro tect its eco
nom ic advances o f the past ten
years. Yet, Paraguayans view C hile’s
participation in MERCOSUR as a
counterw eight to A rgentina and
Brazil. Spokespersons in
M ontevideo, Uruguay, and Bahia
Blanca, A rgentina, are hopeful th at
a trans-A ndean transp o rtatio n sys
tem would link those p o rt cities
with C oncepcion, Chile, thus p ro 
viding the east coast cities with the
econom ic benefits that would com e
from the com m ercial linkage
betw een the eastern an d w estern
hem ispheres.
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three
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O ne US official described MER
COSUR as a storm y Latin
Am erican m arriage, and indeed it
is. No o ne denies th at Brazil is
MERCOSLTR’s engine and that the
fu tu re o f the so u th ern cone rests
u p o n Brazil’s econom ic health. Yet
nationalistic jealousies persist.
A rgentines express etern al opti
mism th at they will catch up with
the Brazilians—a gam e-point score
th at the latter will n o t perm it.
M eanwhile, the Paraguayans are
tired o f being treated like a “step
so n ” by th eir larger neighbors.
Only the U ruguayans seem
resigned to th eir secondary status
and, by staying o u t o f the fracas,
h o p e to becom e hom e to
MERCOSUR's secretariat.
Beyond nationalistic rivalries,
MERCOSUR confronts several
problem s, the m ost contentious
b eing the com m on external tariff.
Each n ation wants to pro tect partic
ular industries, such as autom obiles
and com p u ter software, from out
side com petition. T here is also a
n eed to harm onize labor, tax and
investm ent laws, a difficult task
because o f th e varied im pact that
h arm onization would have upon
each nation. Admittedly, Paraguay
and U ruguay do n o t have the funds
to develop the in frastructure neces
sary to play a significant role in
com m erce, pro m p ting a fear of
being left behind. And while intraMERCOSLiR trade has flourished,
each n ation continues to ru n an
overall trade deficit, which may
lead to agreem ents outside MER
COSUR. For exam ple, the
Brazilians ho p e to reach an accord
with C hina on agricultural goods
and Paraguay hopes to find a spe
cial niche in the C hilean m arket
for processed m eats and toiletries.
Socioeconom ic segm ents within
each co u n try face problem s that
may n o t be MERCOSUR driven,
b u t which will im pact upon future
econom ic cooperation. All govern
m en t spokespersons dism issed as
26 Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three

an “interesting co n c ep t” the sug
gestion th at the contem porary rush
toward privatization o f state-owned
industries parallels the actions of
the late nin eteen th -cen tu ry Latin
A m erican liberals that resulted in
h ig h er prices and lower wages at
hom e while profits were sent
abroad. O ne US embassy official
dismissed this suggestion with the
observation th at any change is
described as neoliberal. But to the
person on the street, h ig h er prices
an d lost jobs are real and h is /h e r
consternation is vocally expressed
on the streets o f Buenos Aires and
M ontevideo. O pposition to m od
ernization in Paraguay com es from
the traditional landed elite and
nearly 200,000 small farm ers and
state em ployees who fear th at the
n a tio n ’s favorable investm ent laws
and privatization plans will cost
them dearly. Brazil’s older indus
trial class in Sao Paulo and resi
dents in the econom ically u n d e rd e 
veloped n o rth ea st region oppose
integration, while the m ilitary is
wary o f any in tern atio n al agree
m en t th at deals with telecom m uni
cations.
Despite these obstacles, th ere is
agreem ent in all four capitals that
the progress m ade in MERCOSLTR
surpasses that o f the E uropean

U nion at the same point in devel
o p m en t and th at all parties are
com m itted to co n tin u ed econom ic
cooperation.
I m p l ic a t io n s

fo r the

U n it e d S t a t e s

W hile the benefits o f NAFTA
continue to be debated in the
U nited States, this study concludes
that the agreem ent has little signifi
cance to the C aribbean an d south
ern cone nations, save the
D om inican Republic. Instead, offi
cials in the CARICOM and MER
COSLTR com m unities link their
n a tio n ’s future econom ic develop
m en t to dom estic an d regional
issues, n o t to decisions m ade in
W ashington. In reality, however,
such positions may be sheer folly
because C aribbean trade is closely
tied to the LTnited States. In the
so uthern cone, Brazil’s effort to
lead a South A m erican consortium
to challenge US econom ic power is
purely an adm ission o f econom ic
weakness. ■
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Unearthing Grassroots Power
E duardo Silva

he fate o f tropical
forests has captured the
im agination o f the
world for over a
decade. Many studies
have diagnosed the
proxim ate and d eeper causes
deforestation and sketched out poli
cy proposals to stem, halt, or reverse
the process. In this debate, the
“shifted cultivator”— the poor, landhungry people who invade the
forests in search of subsistence liv
ing—often bears the b ru n t of the
blam e. Because dem ographic pres
sure and m aldistribution o f agricul
tural land throw these people onto
the frontier in large num bers, policy
prescriptions focus on family plan
ning, halting colonization projects
and road-building, and advocating
land reform , all the while stressing
the n eed for parks and reserves,
and the capacity to m anage them.
This policy preference is often inter
p reted as an attem pt to keep people
from the forest in o rd er to preserve
it. As laudable as those goals are,
serious questions rem ain. W hat will
be the fate of people who inhabit
the forest? Are they to be driven
out? Are they to be blam ed for
deforestation as they seek to survive?
For some time, poverty has been
perceived as a m ajor contributor to
environm ental degradation, espe
cially in rural areas. Consequently,
in the latter half of the 1980s, the
U nited Nations World Commission
on Environm ent and Development,
the B rundtiand Commission,
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Under the assumption that forests are multiple use zones
that can and do provide their inhabitants with a living, the
grassroots development approach promotes agroforestry,
of

community forestry and reforestation, wood harvesting, the

ranching of native fauna, extractive reserves, and ecotourism.
focused on basic needs as a neces
sary com ponent o f sustainable
developm ent, in tandem with a redi
rection o f econom ic growth along a
m ore environm entally friendly path,
population control, and citizen par
ticipation. How to balance econom 
ic growth, environm ental quality,
social equality, and participation
rem ains a com plex policy issue.
In forest policy, the grassroots
developm ent approach m ost direct
ly addresses the livelihood concerns
of economically and socially u n d er
privileged forest dwellers. U nder
the assum ption that forests are mul
tiple use zones that can and do pro
vide their inhabitants with a living,
this approach prom otes agro
forestry, com m unity forestry and
reforestation, wood harvesting, the
ranching o f native fauna, extractive
reserves, and ecotourism . Policies
and projects based on this approach
prom ote the conservation o f forests
at the com m unity level. These poli
cies encourage local self-reliance
and control o f econom ic resources,
the use o f appropriate technologies
that mimic natural processes and
emphasize the linkage o f com m uni
ties to markets.
G r a s s r o o t s D e v e l o p m e n t P o l it ic s

The experiences o f Mexico, Costa
Rica, and Brazil over the past 15

years provide some insights into the
politics of crafting policies and pro
jects that prom ote grassroots devel
opm ent in the forest sector. In the
1980s, Mexico prom oted com m uni
ty forestry am ong forest ejidos (com
m unal farm s that arose as a result of
the Mexican revolution). Based on
sound silvicultural practices, these
grassroots developm ent models
show how com m unities organize to
sustainably harvest forests, build
hum an capital, provide em ploym ent
at better wages, and generate, rein
vest, and distribute profits to the
community. Costa Rica developed a
robust com m unity reforestation p ro
gram in the Pacific northwest. In
accordance with a land ten u re sys
tem based on private property
rights, family farm ers belonging to
cooperatives avail themselves o f gov
ern m en t incentives to reforest with
native o r exotic species. T he coop
erative m ediates between the gov
ern m en t and the farm ers and pro
vides m em bers with technical and
financial support. These cases show
that com m unity forestry is feasible
u n d er both com m unal and individ
ual form s of land tenure rights.
With the creation of extractive
reserves— and a com m itm ent to
legalize Indian land claims—Brazil
offers a case of explicit recognition
of forests as m ultiple use zones,
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stressing its n o ntim ber services:
nuts, rubber, fibers, and o th er agri
cultural products.
U nderstanding the politics that
influenced the m ovem ent toward
grassroots developm ent in forestry
requires analyzing actors, interests,
and power in the context o f eco
nomically and culturally defined
social groups, state institutions and
actors, and external factors. These,
however, are only the essential
building blocks; the dynamics of
coalition building between these
elem ents lies at the h eart o f the pol
itics involved. T he aggregation of
the capabilities o f the different
actors constitutes the coalition’s
power.
W hat kinds of pro-grassroots
developm ent coalitions have been
successful? The Mexican and Costa
Rican cases suggest one path.
Favorable outcom es in those cases
depended on the form ation o f coali
tions between organized com m uni
ties and state and international
actors that supported grassroots
development. Two elem ents were
crucial to the success of the coali
tions. First, the com m unities were
actively seeking help to either
reverse an ab ru p t economic decline
or to counter socioeconomically
advantaged groups with whom they
were locked in a struggle over natur
al resources. Second, relevant state
institutions were sympathetic to
grassroots developm ent from the
outset. In contrast, the Brazilian
case exemplified coalition building
in the absence o f state support for
grassroots development. Domestic
social and ecological groups
required strong support from inter
national actors—US environmental
pressure groups persuaded the
Congress of the U nited States to
threaten Brazil with blockage of
World Bank loans.
These cases dem onstrate that
organized com m unities seeking to
overcome a specific difficulty are the
bedrock of grassroots developm ent
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Given the difficulties of grassroots development, the
tide has turned against this approach as a solution to
the livelihood question for forest dwellers.
coalitions. Such communities active
ly seek allies to help solve their prob
lems and have a vital interest in
im plem enting proposed solutions.
State actors (whenever available)
play crucial roles in these coalitions;
they can protect peasant and indige
nous leaders from their enemies.
Together with nongovernm ental
organizations and international
actors sympathetic to grassroots
development, state actors can also
provide technical expertise, exten
sion services, and funds. But only
organized com m unities will be able to
use these to best avail. If com m uni
ties are not organized, community
forestry projects should make orga
nization the first priority. W herever
possible, such efforts should build
on existing grassroots organizations
even if they have little or no experi
ence in forestry. Otherwise, com pe
tition between new and old groups
can virtually ruin any project.
Grassroots developm ent is diffi
cult. It can be costly in term s of time
(easily up to 10 years worth of pro
ject com m itm ent). This type of
developm ent is capital intensive,
especially in term s of hum an capital
(technical expertise), extension ser
vices, and financial support. More
over, grassroots developm ent
requires great flexibility. It can also
be politically costly because support
for socioeconomic underprivileged
groups can generate powerful ene
mies.
Given these difficulties, the tide
has turned against grassroots devel
opm ent as a solution to the liveli
hood question for forest dwellers.
The reflux is rooted in the desperate
need o f governm ents to generate
export commodities to repay crush
ing foreign debt loans, the concomi

tant bankruptcy of states, and the
emphasis on orthodox market eco
nomics and biodiversity. In this con
text, argum ents for large-scale indus
trial logging or tree plantations to
generate foreign exchange through
exports and direct foreign invest
m ent are gaining popularity.
Moreover, grassroots developm ent
has taken a back seat to a focus on
parks and reserves as a m eans to
conserve biodiversity in many multi
lateral institutions and international
organizations.
T ow ard
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C o n s e r v a t io n is m

Although policies that prom ote
large-scale tim ber industries are gen
erally at odds with grassroots devel
opm ent, the same is not true of con
servation. A “new conservationism ”
is emerging. This philosophy recog
nizes that the viability of parks and
reserves depends in no small mea
sure on their ability to offer solutions
to the livelihood issues that bedevil
impoverished rural populations.
The application o f grassroots development-style projects in buffer zones
should reduce pressure to exploit
the core areas of parks or reserves
that contain essential habitats.
The utility of the buffer zone con
cept for developm ent purposes may
depend on w hether it is narrowly or
broadly interpreted. If reduced to
areas im mediately surrounding a
park or reserve, a buffer zone may
be o f limited utility. T he num bers
of families and the area covered
would be severely restricted.
Success may draw families from the
rest of the country where farm ers
and peasants are being subjected to
bankruptcy and expulsion as the
economics of agriculture concen
trates land in the hands of agribusi
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ness. U n d er these conditions, the
defense of gains by those who b en e
fit front grassroots developm ent
projects in a buffer zone could lead
to eith er social tension, land inva
sions o f protected areas, or both. A
b ro ad er conceptualization o f parks
an d reserves as integral parts of
“areas o f conservation” which are
linked to each o th er m ight offer
b etter chances o f success— Costa
Rica is currently experim enting
with variations o f this idea.
Theoretically, areas o f conservation
distribute grassroots developm entorien ted projects m ore broadly
across the co untry and cover many
activities, such as w atershed m an
agem ent, in teg rated small-scale
agriculture, forestry, reforestation,
and extractive activities.
While the “new conservationism ”
offers the prospect o f integrating
grassroots developm ent with biodi
versity p rotection, the extent to
which this prom ise becom es reality
also d epends on politics. T he fund
ing for such efforts, and their con
ceptualization, lies mostly in the
hands o f m ultilateral lending orga
nizations and conservationist n o n 
governm ental organizations in the
developed nations, especially the
U nited States. T he apprehension
o f grassroots developm ent-oriented
groups in developing countries is
th at these in tern ational actors—
and th eir dom estic sources o f sup
p o rt— are d om inated by persons
primarily co n cern ed with habitat
protection. Thus, all too often, the
obligatory com m unity developm ent
co m p o n en t o f project g ran t com pe
titions is poorly conceived, u n d e r
funded, and excessively lim ited in
its reach. In short, the com m unity
developm ent portion o f the project
ru n s the risk o f being stillborn. In
o th er proposals, such as jo in t
im plem entation o f carbon offset
agreem ents and bioprospecting,
sharing funds with grassroots devel
o p m en t projects is simply n o t on
the agenda.

The “new conservationism ” and
the funds attached to it thus provide
an opportunity for generating grass
roots developm ent projects, bu t we
m ust n o t assume that intellectual
recognition and project require
m ents automatically translate into
action. Given the central role of
international agencies, converting
this opportunity into reality may
involve generating broad coalitions
similar to the ones that obliged the
World Bank to make the environ
m ent a m ore central concern— and
that forced the Brazilian govern
m ent to establish extractive
reserves. These coalitions would
necessarily involve international
nongovernm ental organizations that
take the nexus between grassroots
developm ent and environm ent seri
ously in alliance with forces (peas
ant organizations, nongovernm ental
organizations, unions, and political

parties) within developing coun
tries. In ord er to generate support
for their cause am ong the citizens
of developed nations who are m ain
ly interested in species preservation,
such coalitions would have to
dem onstrate that parks and reserves
cannot survive where hum an popu
lations live in degradation. A cam
paign around those them es might
build pressure—including from the
US Congress—to pay m ore serious
attention to the integration of pro
jects that sustain “alternative” liveli
hoods in conjunction with nature
conservation. This is a difficult task
and the cu rren t political winds may
no t favor it. But if the process of
grassroots m obilization and coali
tion building is no t begun in expec
tation of m ore politically propitious
times, we ru n the risk o f accepting
rhetoric for reality, the shell for the
content. ■
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Lather U p with Hemp
C alifornia voters gave patients who
suffer from certain diseases the
right to smoke m arijuana for m edi
cinal purposes last November.
Jam aica had an o th er idea about
what to do with hem p. In August,
the m inistry o f agriculture told
R euters th at Jam aica would begin
cultivating industrial hem p on an
experim ental basis. T he hem p
would be used to p roduce soaps,
textiles, anim al feed, cosmetics, and
p aper products. T he m inistry
claim ed that the h em p would no t
contain the psychoactive chem ical
found in m arijuana; m easures
would be instituted to prevent any
tam pering with the industrial vari
ety. D rug Czar Barry McCaffrey
had no reaction regarding
Jam aica’s plan, but the Clinton
adm inistration has already threat
en ed US physicians who prescribe
m arijuana with arrest. Might
Jam aica face decertification?

Expand at Your Own Risk
A ccording to a Kroll Associates
rep o rt, Jap an ese an d o th er foreign
m ultinational executives have been
kid n ap p ed by M exican gangs and
are likely to face increasing threats
in the fu tu re unless they and their
com panies are b etter p re p are d to
check the problem . T hree factors
may account for the increase in for
eign kidnappings: the kidnappers
are never caught, the com panies
pay quickly and handsom ely, and
foreign executives are easy tar-
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gets— they are n o t pro tected by
the security m easures that Mexican
executives have ad o p ted as a result
o f th eir own experience. T he case
that p u t this tren d into perspective
was the August 1996 kidnapping of
M am oru K onno, president o f the
Sanyo Video C o m p o n en t C orpora
tion, who was freed by his captors
after his com pany paid $2 m illion
in ransom . T he lam entable situa
tion at the Japanese embassy in
Lima, P eru, may reflect an o th er
twist. A lthough den ied by Japanese
officials, MRTA rebels allegedly
kept business executives longer
than others hoping th at th eir com 
panies would disburse hefty ra n 
soms for th eir release.

How Tough is Tough?
P roponents o f the H elm s-Burton
Law have been m aking some noise
that positive results o f the legisla
tion are already being felt. In early
D ecem ber 1996, the C ouncil of
Ministers o f the E uropean U nion
(EU) adopted a “com m on posi
tio n ” on E uropean policy for the
sup p o rt o f dem ocracy in Cuba.
This position had the consensus of
the 15 m em ber states, including
Spain, which had subm itted a
harsh er proposal. In the text, the
EU encouraged the peaceful transi
tion to dem ocratic pluralism and
the respect for hum an rights in
Cuba. T he EU rejected coercive
m easures that would, according to
the Council, worsen the situation
in Cuba. U n d er the term s o f the
com m on position, the EU an d its
m em ber states agreed to: continue
the dialogue with C uban au th o ri
ties; co ntinue hum anitarian aid—
subject to an agreem ent on its dis

tribution (a Spanish c o n d itio n );
evaluate the evolution o f C u b a’s
dom estic policy; and co n tin u e eco
nom ic actions geared toward
greater openness. Closer relations
between C uba and the EU will now
d ep e n d on the C uban govern
m e n t’s willingness to intro d u ce
political reform s. T he US State
D epartm ent com m ended the EU
for its “to u g h e r” stance and sug
gested that the W hite H ouse m ight
consider waiving penalties against
E uropean firms that do business on
the island.

A Madman in Love
T he transition to dem ocracy in
Latin A m erica b ro u g h t with it a
long dry spell of Latin A m erican
presidents who were foreign
trained, highly sophisticated, and
perhaps a bit too boring. In 1996,
however, the swearing in o f Abdala
Bucaram as p resident o f E cuador
has provided a good dose o f e n ter
tainm ent, although n o t all
E cuadoreans are am used. As is
now com m on knowledge, one of
B ucaram 's first activities as presi
d en t was to record a CD— “A Mad
m an in Love”—with Los Iracundos,
a 1970s U ruguayan po p group. As
if taping the CD were n o t enough,
sources p resen t at the T enth
Iberoam erican Sum m it in Santiago
re p o rt that Bucaram personally
gave copies o f the CD to any
Iberoam erican p resid en t who
would take one. If you are interest
ed in listening to the singing presi
dent, the St. Petersburg Times allows
you to dial in to get a small sample.
Dial (813) 898-0019 and select the
category code 1051. F rank Sinatra,
he is not.
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A Ghost from the Past
W hen P resident C aldera took
office in 1993, the centerpiece of
his cam paign was to end c o rru p 
tion in Venezuela. His call went
over very well and becam e one of
the m ost significant pillars o f the
Sum m it o f the Americas held in
Miami in 1994 and the basis o f a
region-wide pledge to fight co rru p 
tion. T he sincerity o f C aldera’s
cam paign, however, was questioned
in an article by Edward Epstein in
the New Yorker (Septem ber 23)
which claims th at the late A rm and
H am m er paid $3 m illion in bribes
to top gov ern m en t officials of
C ald era’s first governm ent in 1971
to secure oil rights for O ccidental
P etroleum . A pparently H am m er
reco rd ed the conversations with
Venezuelan gov ern m ent officials.
In 1976, P resident Carlos A ndres
Perez paid $40 m illion in com pen
sation after his governm ent nation
alized the oil sector. C aldera may
be suffering from a bad case of
born-again transparency.

It Is Never Too Late
Miguel R odriguez O rejuela, one of
the Cali C artel’s principal leaders
(who has been serving tim e in
B ogota’s La Picota prison) has
decided th at he will use his spare
time to obtain a degree in business
adm inistration. A ccording to
Semana (Septem ber 23), R odriguez
paid 90 thousand pesos for a dis
tance learn in g course from the
U niversidad del Sur. His guards at
La Picota re p o rt th at the diligent
stu d en t spends several hours a day
on his new project. State
D ep artm en t officials have stated
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that R odriguez spends the rest of
his tim e m anaging the old business
es he left b eh in d in Cali— old
habits die hard.

Cat on a H ot Tin R o o f
Six years after being credited with
rescuing A rg en tin a’s econom y from
the brink o f chaos, fo rm er M inister
o f Econom y D om ingo Cavallo has
em barked on a cam paign th at has
P resident M enem and his su p p o rt
ers angry. Cavallo has m ade accu
sations that a “m afia” operates with
im punity in A rgentina. His calls
have gen erated a great deal o f
attention; the Radicales, m em bers
of the principal opposition party,
have called him to testify in
Congress while the Peronistas have
gone to the courts to prevent
Cavallo from speaking out. It is
unlikely th at Cavallo will be sen
tenced or that he will lose credibili
ty because o f the confrontation
with his fo rm er employer. H e has
already m ade a nam e for him self as
an in tern atio n al consultant. His
first client is no n e o th er than
Abdala Bucaram of Ecuador.

A Dark Crusade
While the Peruvian governm ent
bragged about the dism antling of
the MRTA, the guerilla g roup was
apparently busy expanding its
in tern atio n al network. As early as
1993, N estor C erpa, the leader of
the group that took over the
Japanese embassy in Lima, was busy
orchestrating kidnappings in
Bolivia. Sources close to the
Bolivian governm ent claim th at the
MRTA, or groups linked to this
organization, carried out a nu m b er

E

of kidnappings before the
Novem ber 1995 abduction o f
Sam uel D oria M edina, the e n tre 
p re n e u r whose family paid over $1
m illion in ransom . T he Bolivian
governm ent confirm ed in late
D ecem ber that C erpa and his
g roup m oved in an d out o f the
country using falsified docum ents.
T he war chest that MRTA accum u
lated to carry o u t the Japanese
embassy assault was th e p ro d u ct of
a n u m b er o f ransom s paid by
p ro m in en t Bolivian and Peruvian
families for the liberation o f th eir
relatives.

Honduran Virtual Reality
T he H o n d u ra n arm y an n o u n ced in
late D ecem ber 1996 th at it was
stripping C olonel Jose G uadalupe
Reittel Caballero o f his title as mili
tary attache in Mexico and confin
ing him to house arrest in
Tegucigalpa. It appears that the
intrepid C olonel has written a
p ap e r entitled “El Inform e 2000:
u n a realidad virtual de las fuerzas
arm adas de H o n d u ra s” which,
am ong o th er factors, states th at the
arm y is destined to disappear, ju st
like dinosaurs, because o f growing
in tern al co rru p tio n . T he re p o rt
notes that the chief o f the army
runs the institution as th o u g h it
were a private hacien d a and that
“while the generals use m ilitary
ships and boats to im p o rt Italian
ceram ics and sum ptuous lam ps for
their m ansions, the officers subsist
with low salaries.” T he H o n d u ran
arm y is taking these charges seri
ously. Spokesperson C olonel Mario
David Villanueva claim ed that
“Reittel Caballero is lying... and will
be punished for his crim e.” ■
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The Last Hurrah
G a r y B ran a-S h u te

ewspapers in the
U nited States and,
especially, the
N etherlands, trum 
peted the May 1996
victory of the m ulti
ethnic New Front over form er mili
tary com m ander and one-time dic
tator Desi B outerse’s National
Democratic Front (NDP) as
Surinam e’s conclusive re tu rn to and
preference for “democracy.” The
forces o f evil—n o t to m ention abun
dant patronage—were held at bay.
T he victory was a slim one.
Com posed of the Afro-Creole
Surinam e National Party (NPS), the
East Indian Progressive Reform
Party (VHP), the Javanese Party of
National Unity and H arm ony
(KTPI), and a small Creole-domi
nated labor party, the Surinam e
Labor Party (SPA), the delicately
balanced New Front coalition
scored 24 of the 51 National
Assembly seats. T he statist NDP,
headed by Desi Bouterse since his
removal as Com m ander-in-Chief of
the military in 1992, weighed in
with 16 seats. T he Democratic
Alternative (DA) '91, com prised of
m ultiethnic yuppies, got four;
Pendawalima, a Javanese splinter
party, surprised all and copped four;
while Alliantie, a breakaway group
from the NDP, won a m odest three.
Less than 60 p ercen t o f the elec
torate tu rn ed out.

N

Gary Brana-Shute teaches Anthropology
at the George Washington University
and the Catholic University of America,
and Caribbean Studies at the Foreign
Service Institute. He was a 1991 and
1996 OAS election monitor in
Suriname.
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Elections in Suriname 1987-1996
1987

1991

1996

40

30

24

NDP

3

12

16

DA '91

X

9'

4

Pendawalima

4

2"

4

Alliantie

X

X

3

Party for the Developm ent
o f the Interior(ABOP)

X

X

0

Progressive Workers and
Farm ers Party (PALU)

4

X

X

Party
New F ront

9 in four-member coalition

2 in coalition with DA ’91

O ur first revelation is that no one
party has a majority to form a gov
ernm ent in Surinam e’s parliam en
tary system. Eugenia C harles’s warn
ing resonates— “Coalitions don't
work in the C aribbean.” Second, in
the context of Surinam e’s arcane
laws, the Speaker o f the Assembly (a
post long-held by Jagarnath
Lachm on, octogenarian leader of
the V H P), requires a majority vote
(26) o f the Assembly—which he
barely received in late July. Both the
President and the Vice President of
the Republic m ust be elected by the
National Assembly with a two-thirds
majority vote (34). If the majority
vote is no t achieved, the selection
process is thrown into a nationwide
forum of local, district, and national
ly elected officials, num bering 869
participants (51 national parliam en
tarians, 106 district representatives,
and 712 subdistrict officials). This
setback occurred in 1991 and it took
five m onths to seat an executive.

Electoral results since the first post
dictatorship elections in 1987 have
shown a m arked decline in the for
tunes of the (New) Front.
I will spare the reader the intrica
cies, betrayals, personality spats, and
policy disputes which culm inated in
party breakups, realignm ents, and
the em ergence of new coalitions.
The salient point is that in Suri
nam e, the opposition outnum bers
the New Front by 27 to 24 and the
New Front is com pelled to make a
coalition governm ent. Meanwhile,
the successes of the NDP have grown
consistently and dramatically since
its first post-dictatorship ru n at the
polls—when the NDP clearly was the
political arm o f the military. In fact,
the NDP’s gain from 1991 to 1996 is
greater than the apparent four seats
since two m em bers o f the NDP
broke away to form Alliantie, thus
m aking the absolute gain of the
NDP leap from a real base o f 10 to
16.
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The end of ethnic politics in Suriname
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How th en do we account for the
co n tinuing decline o f the m ultieth
nic New Front, the surge in
strength o f the NDP, and the ongo
ing social and econom ic problem s
which plague S urinam e’s “race to
n atio n h o o d over ethnic te rra in ,” as
B rakette Williams snappily sums up
the conundrum ?
In describing Surinam e, tourist
b rochures use words and phrases
such as luscious, fecund, a tropical
paradise, and a veritable U nited
Nations with each ethnic g ro u p ’s
bountiful hospitality surpassing the
other. This codification was never
true. W ith yearly visits, I have seen
a nation grow desperate, cynical,
anxious, and hostile. T he urban
p roletariat is im poverished, the
m iddle class lives on the edge of
bankruptcy, and youth are disen
franchised and have given up on
the neocolonial politics o f the old
F ronters and th eir grey-beard sup
porters. Revenues from narcotics
transshipping and m oney lau n d er
ing flow th ro u g h the co u n try ’s
veins—keeping it alive— together
with wildcat gold m ining along the
Litani and M aroni Rivers, and
u n co n tro lled tim ber cutting in
S u rinam e’s vast ju n g le interior. By
the way, it takes about US$ 18 mil
lion p er m onth to keep Surinam e
ru n n in g (the co untry is the size of
the state of G eorgia and has a p o p 
ulation of approxim ately 400,000).
D utch aid, held up after the abuses
o f the 1980s, loom s like an obses
sion; yet Surinam e ignores the strict
m easures o f a structural adjustm ent
plan reco m m en d ed by every out
side d o n o r and governm ent. The
F ro n t/N ew F ront governm ents of
1987 and 1991 (the form er

deposed by a “telep h o n e” coup in
1990) have n o t proven themselves
up to the jo b and have evidenced a
m arked inability to govern u n d er
stress. T he country, especially the
young, want a “strong” m an o r at
least a fresh start from the old eth
nic parties, elite cartels, and consociational deal making.
Desire D elano Bouterse, fifty
years old, form er m ilitary com m an
der, de facto head o f governm ent
during the 1980s, head of the NDP
(although no t a candidate for
office) and renow ned as a doe-man
rath er than a taki-man (a doer
rath er than a talker) is the richest
m an in Surinam e. Bouterse
amassed his fortune, converted it
into political capital, galvanized the
aspirations o f his new supporters,
and positioned him self as leader of
a very powerful opposition— almost
rehabilitating him self from alleged
m u rd erer to politician.
NDP's slogan leti a faya (light the
fire) appeared all over Param aribo
and the poorer, C reole neighbor
hoods. NDP planners had targeted
youth as long ago as the 1987 elec
tions and m arketed their now aging
leadership as young(er), vital, and
class ra th e r than ethnic-oriented
(the 1970s slogan “socialism is love”
is alive and well in S u rin am e). The
NDP pitched a class-based national
ism and played on anticolonial
resentm ent and the energetic— but
half-baked—aspirations o f frustrat
ed youth. At one mass m eeting,
the young swooned over Desi’s
th u n d erin g call for “order, disci
pline, and organization” and for a
m om ent it was as if one was living
in M aurice B ishop’s G renada. O ne
extra seat was picked up in
Param aribo.

The jungle interior, inhabited by
M aroons and Am erindians, proved
to be the NDP’s richest harvest.
T he districts o f Para, Marowijne,
B rokopondo, and Sipaliwina togeth
er make 13 seats, o f which the NDP
won seven, up from three in 1991.
All of Surinam e’s A m erindians
voted NDP as did m ore than half of
the M aroons, both groups fed up
with the Front's ineffectiveness dur
ing and after the civil war of the late
1980s. T he NDP spent fortunes in
the bush, gave away chain saws,
arranged small-scale tim ber and
gold contracts and concessions, and
dispensed cash. As one Djuka
M aroon said at the Dritabikki
polling station: "We walk with h u n 
gry bellies and the NDP puts rice in
them .”
T he urban poor and jungle
dwellers were not the only support
ers of the NDP. Many intellectuals,
leaders, and middle-class func
tionaries swung their votes to NDP.
“How can any self-respecting
Surinam er vote for the corrupt, donothing New Front?” I was repeated
ly asked by form er Fronters. The
renegade New F ronters’ com plete
com m itm ent to NDP doctrine—
nationalistic and a m ultiethnic polit
ical party (the only one in
Surinam e)—was tem pered by only
one doubt: the lingering presence
of Desi Bouterse. A lthough the for
m er com m ander has shown a credi
ble effort to redefine him self and
many say that he is “rehabilitated”
(after the m urders o f 1982 and
o ther civil rights abuses), others fear
that he and the local cocaine-fueled
“m afia” would take over the country.
If the NDP is strong, why is the
New F ront so weak? In a nutshell,
the New F ront is old, exhausted,
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corrupt, and without a vision. To be
fair, throughout the late 1970s and
since 1987 the New Front has kept
the risk of ethnic conflict low by ven
turing little beyond politics and the
consociational convention of distrib
uting graft and patronage up and
down and around the ethnic system
of party favoritism. While patronage
was given to the East Indians, the
Creoles, and the Javanese, the
M aroons and the Am erindians were
left em pty-handed—that is why the
Front lost the interior in 1996.
Years ago Rosemary Brana-Shute
wrote about w om en’s political clubs
in a traditional neighborhood in
lower class Paramaribo. The women
had pledged their loyalty to the
NPS, not based on ideology but
diepie bri-bii, a “religious belief.”
Those women are all old now, dead
or have m igrated to the
Netherlands; in fact, virtually the
entire group supporting the New
Front is m iddle aged or older. The
melodies heard during political ral
lies brought to the forefront the
generation gap: the NDP played hip
hop, reggae, and ragga while, at
New Front rallies, the only object
missing was Lawrence Welk’s bubble
machine.
T he End

of

E t h n ic it y

The ethnic strangle hold—
apan’jit—on Surinam e’s political
choices has loosened over the years,
primarily in the afterm ath of the rev
olution, civil war, and the retu rn of
the expatriots from the N etherlands
with their university degrees and
experiences (and, like Trinidad,
consisting of an increasingly “m ixed
g ro u p ” of voters). Surinam e’s politi
cal choices have increased dram ati
cally, with six different parties/coali
tions com prised of 13 separate polit
ical parties ru n n in g in 1996. Class
and ideology have conclusively
entered the discourse; linkages have
been m ade as follows: New Front,
ethnic-centrist; NDP, m ultiethnic,
nationalist-socialist; DA '91, m ultieth
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nic, business/private sector orient
ed; Alliantie, similar to NDP’s stance
but distancing itself from Bouterse
and the military; Pendawalima,
Javanese-centrist; and ABOP— a cre
ation o f the form er rebel Ronnie
Brunswijk—Maroon.
The New F ront’s first chore was to
establish a governm ent and negotia
tions were going on with DA '91 and
Pendawalima— the political distance
between the three parties is no t that
great although the personalities
heading the parties are all testy. If a
deal is cut and if it sticks, it would
yield a majority o f 32 seats; enough
to obtain a governm ent and a speak
er of the parliam ent but not a presi
dent. The three-party coalition
would actually be com prised of eight
political parties (New Front—four,
DA '91—three, and Pendawalima).
You can bet the yuppies in DA '91
will no t want the ancient Jagarnath
Lachm on as speaker. This tender
reed of a coalition m ust then nudge
its choice of vice president and pres
ident through an 869 m em ber
national forum . T he New Front has
the local, district, and national sim
ple majority to advance its candi
date—probably, once again, the taci
turn Ronald Venitiaan. This choice
though would jeopardize its
National Assembly coalition with the
two partners who want a m ore
dynamic (and a less black national
ist) leader. Meanwhile, the NDP
and Alliantie will be probing for
every weakness in the coalition’s
arm or and strengthening themselves
for a snap election—which they have
publicly said they will work for in
two to three years. Particularly vul
nerable are labor unions which have
becom e increasingly disenchanted
with their representation through
SPA o f the New Front. It is claimed
that the head of SPA, Fred Derby,
can no longer control n o r direct the
powerful labor constituency.
Will the New Front hold? The
most often heard cliche is that as the
economy improves the fortunes of

the party in power will advance. I
do no t see that happening. With
Surinam e’s ethnic occupational spe
cialization, the econom ic improve
m ent of one ethnic group will occur
at the relative expense o f another.
Sooner or later, some sort of struc
tural adjustm ent program must be
m ounted, the military m ust be fur
ther downsized and professionalized,
and the ram pant crime, corruption,
and narcotics trafficking m ust be
brought u n d er control. (The editor
of a leading Surinam e newspaper
claims that 50% o f GDP circulates as
drug-related money [rem em ber the
$18 million?].)
T he formalities of Surinam e’s
democracy have functioned and the
election of 1996, like 1991 and 1987,
was open, secret, and without irregu
larities. Look for an o th er one in
about two years and keep your eyes
on the NDP.
P o s t s c r ip t

By early August 1996, parliam en
tary coalitions had taken shape. Five
m em bers of the East Indian VHP
faction of the Front coalition bolted
from their party, declared them 
selves VHP 2000, and form ed an
alliance with the NDP. Moreover,
DA '91 and Pendawalima, each with
four seats, declared themselves the
“m iddle block” and tentatively
agreed to work in coalition with the
Front. With the Front now down to
19 seats, its allied strength in parlia
m ent stood at 27. T he NDP was
able to count on VHP 2000 and
Alliantie—and a com bined force of
24 seats. Two rounds o f presidential
voting took place in the National
Assembly and proved inconclusive;
candidates Venitiaan (Front) and
W ijdenbosch (NDP) were virtually
running neck and neck, and nei
ther obtained the requisite twothirds vote. Thus, the election o f a
president was thrown to the Peoples’
Representatives Com mittees before
Septem ber 8th when the m andate of
the governm ent expired. W hether
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the Front coalition could hold on
for even this long was the object of
intense speculation and all eyes were
on the KTPI faction of the Front
(whose m em bers were unhappy with
the n um ber and nature of cabinet
seats they were being offered).
Meanwhile, in early August, the
18th-century National Assembly
building and two governm ent m in
istries mysteriously bu rn ed to the
ground. (There is a tradition of
political arson in Suriname.)
The five VHP 2000 parliam entari
ans left the Front, the equivalent of
a political gaping chest wound. Yet
even m ore dam age was inflicted in
late August. Willie Soemita, who
always m ade sure his Javanese KTPI
was in governm ent, was lured away
by the NDP and bolted from the
Front with his five seats. The NDP
and its allies now controlled 26 seats
with the brain-dead Front holding
only 14 seats. Even if the Front
could hang onto the “m iddle block”
and their eight seats, the Front
would have controlled only a m inori
ty 22 seats to the NDP’s 26. With
support from two of Alliantie’s three
seats, the NDP coalition num bered a
steam roller 28. The NDP could
then form a governm ent and, with
this m om entum , could surely have
swayed the Peoples’ Representatives
Committees to vote their m an, Jules
W ijdenbosch, to the Presidency.
This developm ent would have
pleased Desi Bouterse.
O n Septem ber 5, 1996, the assem
bled U nited Peoples’ Committees
voted 438 to 407 in favor of Jules
W ijdenbosch as President of
Suriname. Pretap Rhadakishun,
favorite of the breakaway VHP 2000
block, was elected Vice President.
T he old New Front is dead and poli
tics as we know it in Surinam e has
been transform ed. The question is,
will the NDP resort to its authoritari
an traditions o f the 1980s or will the
young ideologues of the “new poli
tics” prevail. My m oney is on the
form er scenario. ■

THE

Southeast Museum
of Photography
Serving the South,
the Caribbean iff the World

1997 E x h i b i t i o n

P rogram S chedule
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7-May 23, 1997

Archives a n d Archetypes: P h o to g rap h s by B arbara N o rfleet
A c a re e r retrospective by an artist n o te d fo r b o th d o c u m e n 
tary a n d c o n stru c te d images.
L otte Jacobi: Artist a n d M entor
A survey o f the a rtist’s vast p ortfolio w hich sp a n n ed m ore
th an 50 years.
Jazz! Portraits o f Black M usicians by David Spitzer
A trib u te to jazz greats by a Florida p h o to g ra p h e r.
Security E nvelope Grid: Cindy B e rn a rd
A co n cep tu al work using p h o to g ra p h s o f everyday p a tte rn s
to c o n stru c t a site-specific installation.
R ecent Accessions: T h e M exican Portfolio
P h o to g rap h s fro m th e M useum ’s p e rm a n e n t collection.
S u m m e r 1997 E x h i b i t i o n s — J u n e

17-Septem ber 19, 1997

To the Dogs: P h o to g rap h s by Elliot Erwitt
Telling O u r Own Stories: F lo rid a’s Family P h o to g rap h s
Som e People: P eter Foe
Som e Things: T orben E skerod, C lint Im b o d en , A belardo
M orrell, Veselovsky Pitts

S o u th e a s t M u se u m

o f P h o to g ra p h y

1200 West In tern atio n al Speedway Boulevard, Daytona Beach, Florida 32114
Museum H ours: Tuesady - Friday: 10-3, Tuesday: 5-7, Saturday & Sunday: 1-4
Admission is always free. For m ore inform ation call: (904) 254-4475

Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three

Features: D om inican Republic

Unwanted Fame
J o se p h R ogers

W

hile President
Leonel

Fernandez has
com m itted his
new adm inistra
tion to an agen
da to consolidate dem ocracy and
provide econom ic opportunities in
the D om inican Republic, another
potentially corrosive process is
underw ay in this country. In Santo
D om ingo’s halls of power and acad
emic circles, the prospect o f a new
political and econom ic era is dis
cussed with excitem ent and antici
pation. N ot discussed, however, is
the ongoing problem o f narcotics
trafficking and the consolidation of
power by Dom inican drug traffick
ing organizations. T he Dom inican
Republic is now considered by the
US DEA the com m and, control, and
com m unications center for
C aribbean d ru g trafficking activi
ties. Dom inican organizations over
see and m onitor m ost of the logisti
cal requirem ents to move cocaine:
aircraft, boats, global positioning
systems for transportation, and
radios and cellular phones for com
m unications and m anagem ent of
organizations th at stretch from New
York to Colombia. T he consolida
tion of power by Dom inican nar
cotics trafficking organizations has
the potential to un derm ine the
Fernandez agenda.
T he Dom inican Republic has
Joseph
is a Mellonent
Fellow
at the
been aRogers
key transshipm
point
for
Latin
American
and
Caribbean
Center
illicit narcotics th ro ughout the
at Florida International University,
where he is completing a Ph.D. in
International Relations.
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1990s. A nu m b er of factors con
tribute to this phenom enon. The
most im portant is the close link
between the Dom inican Republic
and New York, where m ost of the
cocaine, and recently Colombian
heroin, is destined. Dominicans
have becom e an im portant force in
New York’s political and econom ic
life, with over an estim ated 500,000
residents.
T h e S a n F r a n c is c o C o n n e c t i o n

The Dom inican Republic lies m id
way between the U nited States and
Colombia, the source o f m ost o f the
cocaine consum ed in the US.
Dom inican traffickers share a lan
guage and cultural legacy with their
Colom bian partners. In recent
years, they have developed close ties
at the production, transportation,
and distribution points of the
cocaine trade. F urtherm ore, they
have been able to exploit well-developed family and business ties in
New York. Consequently, Dom ini
can traffickers have becom e prom i
n en t players in the US cocaine
trade.
At hom e, a long history of
Machiavellian ploys and political
corruption has encouraged behav
ior that fu rth e r facilitates D om ini
can participation in the drug trade.
A p rom inent Dom inican counter
drug official traces the origins of
the Dom inican drug trade to
groups that were exiled by President
Joaquin Balaguer in 1965. This offi
cial points to a group from San
Francisco de Macoris as the most
notable example. This region has a
long history of resistance against
authority and familiarity with arms.
The San Francisco group developed
an “ends justify the m eans” ideolo

gy, and once exiled, sought funds to
overthrow the Balaguer govern
m ent. O ne way the group obtained
funds was by form ing a d ru g traf
ficking “cartel.” Today, many
Dom inican traffickers hail from San
Francisco de Macoris.
In addition, some judges, politi
cians, and law enforcem ent person
nel can be bought for the right
price. T he low wages o f public ser
vants in the Dom inican Republic
allow the traffickers to buy the ser
vices of these bureaucrats at a rela
tively low cost. T he inability of
these institutions to pursue, prose
cute, and punish traffickers is
an o th er structural feature en co u r
aging Dom inicans to participate in
the lucrative drug trade.
Dom inican d ru g trafficking orga
nizations have evolved since the for
m ation o f the San Francisco Cartel
in the 1960s. In the 1980s, the
Colombians developed trust in
Dom inican traffickers as a group
that could effectively move and dis
tribute Colom bian cocaine—while
rem itting the proceeds. In fact,
Dom inicans m odeled their drug
trafficking “style” after the
Colombians, becom ing m ore and
m ore sophisticated with time. As
the Dom inicans achieved success in
ru n n in g drug trafficking enterpris
es, they displaced the form idable
Jam aican “posses” in New York.
Underlying the D om inicans’ success
was a willingness to use violence to
protect their drug trafficking “tu rf”
and product.
By the 1990s, Dom inican drug
traffickers had moved into o th er
cities where large num bers of
Dom inicans resided. Today,
Dom inicans control distribution
centers around Boston and
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Dominican Republic—headquarters for narcotraffickers

Baltimore and provide o ther traf
ficking groups with cocaine in
W ashington, D.C., Richm ond, and
o th er East Coast cities. In 1993, a
US congressional rep o rt called the
Dom inicans the second largest
cocaine distributors on the East
Coast, after the Colombians.
C om m and

and

C ontrol

Meanwhile, Dom inican traffickers
were perfecting their craft at hom e.
Dom inicans had long been involved
in sm uggling illegal aliens across
the M ona C hannel, in small craft
called yolas, to P uerto Rico. Soon
drugs were included in these trips,
proceeding to New York and else
where w ithout passing through
Customs. In addition, large num 
bers o f legal and illegal Dom inicans
rem ained in P uerto Rico, fu rth er
strengthening this link in the
cocaine trafficking chain.
U nited States co unterdrug poli
cies fu rth er propelled Dom inican
groups toward the pinnacle of the
d ru g trafficking world. W hen
President Clinton took office in
1993, he ann o u n ced a “controlled
shift” to transfer technical assets
from the “transit zo n e” in the
Caribbean to the A ndean supply
countries of Colombia, Bolivia and
Peru. Two rad ar sites in the
Dom inican Republic were removed,
leaving US and Dom inican counter
d ru g forces with an inability to
detect aircraft below 5,000 feet. As
a result, traffickers renew ed the
practice o f the 1980s to drop loads
after flying over Dom inican air
space. Technology plays a key role
as m ore sophisticated radios, cellu
lar phones and global positioning
systems are used by traffickers.
Dom inican trafficking groups have

The Dominican Republic is now considered by the US DEA
the command, control, and communications center for
Caribbean drug trafficking activities.
used these com m unication m odes
along their east coast, where drugs
can be moved directly to Puerto
Rico, and increasingly in a m oun
tainous corridor between Bani and
B arahona, northw ard to Puerto
Plata. Aircraft have becom e too
valuable an asset for pilots to land
and risk detection, arrest and
seizure o f planes.
F r ee T r a d e

and

D rugs

O ne o f the most notable features
about Dom inican drug trafficking
organizations is their flexibility, fust
as law enforcem ent officials were
starting to understand these activi
ties, trafficking groups changed
their modus operandi. A recent shift
in the traffickers' strategy may be
the m ost difficult for the
D om inican governm ent and the US
DEA to counter: the use o f cargo
containers and free trade zones.
These zones may ensure that m ost
o f the goods that leave the
Dom inican Republic do so w ithout
inspection. According to US DEA,
with one customs inspector for
every 15 or 20 com panies,
Dom inican traffickers have allegedly
resorted to placing some o f their
cocaine in cargo containers bound
for the US, with little risk of detec
tion. If this trend continues, traf
fickers will be able to com partm en
talize their operations, leaving one
person responsible for the trans
portation part o f the operation,
w ithout a direct link to those ulti

mately receiving the cocaine. The
use of the free zones is especially
worrisom e because one of the pil
lars o f President F ern an d ez’s eco
nom ic reform program is expand
ing the free trade zones and
increasing unfettered com m erce.
T h e E a s t e r n C a r ib b e a n

Dom inican drug trafficking orga
nizations have used their expertise
to control the cocaine trade in New
York, P uerto Rico, and now, St.
M aarten and St. Kitts. Dom inican
groups began using these eastern
C aribbean islands to avoid detec
tion. In this region, they employ
m ethods similar to those used in
sm uggling aliens and drugs across
the M ona C hannel, and move the
cocaine through P uerto Rico to
New York. Dom inicans have
expanded these operations to o th er
islands and now control most o f the
cocaine traffic in the Caribbean.
M o d e r n -D ay D i s t i n c t i o n

If the trends highlighted above
are correct, the Dom inican
Republic has earn ed the label of
com m and, control and com m unica
tions center of Caribbean d ru g traf
ficking. From the Dom inican
Republic, 15 m ajor trafficking
organizations control the m ovem ent
of drugs across the Caribbean to
the continental U nited States.
These groups have becom e so p ro 
ficient at moving cocaine through
the C aribbean, that in some operaHemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three
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tions, Colombians may actually work
for the Dominicans. F urtherm ore,
according to New York narcotics
officers, some New York-based
D om inican groups have gone
directly to Colom bia to negotiate
prices and arrange transportation.
The Dom inicans also retain respon
sibility for the distribution of drugs
in New York’s W ashington Heights.
T he execution of these tasks
requires the use o f sophisticated
com m unications and m anagem ent
techniques. T he com partm entalization of operations is a popular way
o f ensuring th at the organization
becom es less vulnerable to dism an
tling. In short, Dom inicans have
becom e a m ajor cocaine trafficking
group in the U nited States.
U nited States counterdrug offi
cials have apparently recognized
this tren d and have com m itted the
same type of sophisticated electron
ic intelligence gathering equipm ent
used in Colombia to the Dom inican
Republic. Seizures have risen in the
last three fiscal years, from 2,000
kilos in 1993 to over 4,000 in 1996.
However, the exact am ount of
cocaine transiting through the
Dom inican Republic rem ains
unclear. T he increase may reflect
better reporting techniques rather
than a net increase in trafficking.
In many ways, President
Fernandez and his group of advisors
find themselves between the prover
bial rock and a h ard place. To
deliver on the prom ise of opening
the political and econom ic process
es in the Dom inican Republic,
President Fernandez m ust pursue
policies that encourage greater
trade and safeguard the rights o f all
Dominicans. The process o f dem o
cratic consolidation is daunting in
the best o f circumstances. With
increasingly powerful drug traffick
ing organizations in the Dom inican
Republic, President Fernandez
could face challenges similar to
those that u n d erm in e Colombian
democracy. ■
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Customs Guide to the Americas 1997
This update from last year's Guide includes a special
section geared to the state of Florida. The Guide is
intended to give the user an overview of customs proce
dures— not regulations. An introductory matrix outlining
trade agreements and participating countries is useful
for traders and the business community in general.

Chile: A Hemispheric Force
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Chile's economy, trade patterns, and policies are exam
ined in this report. The primary purpose is to provide
information and analysis that will allow the private sec
tor to identify potential opportunities and challenges
presented by Chile's growing role in the global econo
my. The potential impacts that Chile's accession to
NAFTA would have on the U.S. and Florida are also
identified in a nonquantitative manner.
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Annual Report on Trade 1 996/1997
For the trader, strategist, and economic development
community, this Annual Report presents analyses of
three- to five-year trends in merchandise trade among
the U.S., Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean.
Growth commodities and Florida's competitive regions
in the U.S. are also identified.

Brazil-Florida: Commercial Connections
Brazil's economy is the world's tenth largest and by far
the biggest in Latin America. Political and economic
data are analyzed, including Brazil's new economic
recovery plan and its new currency, the real.
Privatization and liberalization regimes are examined
over the past five years.

MERCOSUR-Florida Relations
The second largest trading bloc within the Americas,
MERCOSUR is an enigma to many businesses. This
report examines MERCOSUR with an eye to under
standing its business climate, and is directed to business
and industry executives.
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G lobal M anager P rogram
C e n t e r f o r I n t e r n a t io n a l E x e c u t iv e E d u c a t io n
C

ollege o f

B u s in e s s A

d m in is t r a t io n

F l o r id a In t e r n a t io n a l U

n iv e r s it y

T h e G lobal M an ag er P rogram , offered by Florida International U niversity’s C en ter for International Executive E ducation, is an
intensive developm ent program designed to prepare executives for the responsibilities an d o p p o rtu n ities o f m anagem ent in the
new m illennium . Participants from U.S. and foreign businesses are bro u g h t together to explore the potential o f th e global busi
ness arena an d develop the com petencies necessary to m eet em erging challenges. T h ro u g h a com bin atio n o f lectures, case stu d 
ies, and small group learning exercises, th e program participants reevaluate old ideas, explore new ones, and form ulate strategic
plans for their individual enterprises.

P R O G R A M D E S C R IP T IO N

W H O SH O U LD ATTEND?

T he program is organized around three one-week modules.

Program participants should:

Each o f the week-long modules emphasizes a different dim en
sion o f m anagem ent in the dynamic international arena. T he

•

have attained or be on track to attain a position in general

physical locations for each m odule are chosen to reinforce the

m anagem ent or be a functional division head w ith strategic

core learning concepts.

m anagem ent responsibilities;

M odule I - U p d atin g an d Integrating th e Fundam entals:
S tre n g th en in g

C o re

F u n ctio n al

C o m p e te n c ie s

•

an d

be from an organization that is currently international or
has the desire to become a player in the international busi

D eveloping M ultifunctional Integrative Skills. D u rin g this

ness arena;

week, participants are familiarized w ith the latest knowledge
and advances in the fundam ental functional areas o f m arket

•

have a m inim um o f five (5) years o f managerial experience;

•

hold responsibility for activities that are im pacted by inter

ing, finance, inform ation systems, organization theory, hum an
resource m anagem ent, an d strategic m anagem ent.

national competitive forces; and
M odule II - D eveloping Team and Leadership Skills in a
M ulticultural Business E nvironm ent. T h e focus o f the second

•

have the strong support o f a sponsoring institution.

m odule is on the developm ent o f the skills and competencies
necessary to be an adaptable, flexible, and responsive manager
in an uncertain global business environm ent characterized by

F O R M O R E IN F O R M A T IO N

complexity and diversity.
To receive more inform ation about the Global M anager
M odule III -

M an ag in g th e C hallenges o f a G lobal

Program, please contact:

Competitiveness. D uring the final module, participants exam
ine the challenges to organizations com peting in an evolving

C enter for International Executive Education

global environm ent. Emerging trends such as the “virtual cor

College o f Business Adm inistration

poration” and the “boundariless organization” are evaluated as

Florida International University

potential responses to the transformation o f business in the eco

University Park, M iami, Florida 33199, USA

nom ic arena. Further, participants are exposed to issues relating

Telephone: (305) 348-3279

the organization to the broader economic, social, and legal envi

Fax: (305) 348-2368

ronm ents. Topics such as the dynamics o f business-government

E-mail: CIEE@ FIU .ED U

interaction, the im pact o f international laws on inter-company

Internet: http://w ww .fiu.edu/CIEE

alliances, and the role o f ethics in a contem porary society are
explored.
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The European Connection
P e te r A . P en fold

o the Latin Am erican
d ru g trafficker, the
C aribbean represents
ju st one entity through
which the m erchandise
can pass to reach the
lucrative m arkets of the U nited
States and Europe. T he d ru g traf
ficker ignores—b u t at the same
time exploits— the region's territo r
ial boundaries and national differ
ences. By using various routes
th ro u g h different C aribbean coun
tries, the d ru g trafficker spreads the
risk of detection. Meanwhile, due
to the local spillover effect of the
d ru g trade, the d rug trafficker also
spreads m ore widely throughout
the region the problem s associated
with drugs.
T he view held by most C aribbean
states in the past was th at d ru g traf
ficking was n o t their problem — it
was a problem for the Latin
Am erican p ro d u cer countries and
the N orth Am erican and E uropean
consum er countries. They, the
C aribbean countries, just happened
to be on the ro u te through which
the drugs passed. T he traffickers,
though, began to pay those who
helped the flow of drugs through
the C aribbean in kind as well as in
cash; a local dem and was created,
d ru g abuse and drug-related crim e
increased, and governm ents came
to realize th at d ru g trafficking was

T

Peter A. Penfold is currently the British
government’s Special Adviser on Drugs
in the Caribbean. He was a member of
the European Union team of drug
experts which produced the report “The
Caribbean and the Drug Problem. ”
Peter Penfold has been named High
Commissioner to Sierra Leone.
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in fact a problem . Some countries,
often with outside assistance partic
ularly from the U nited States and
Britain, took m easures to counter
the flow of drugs. T he traffickers,
however, continued to exploit the
weakest links in the chain o f efforts
to curtail the trade, whilst many of
the small island states continued to
tu rn a blind eye, eith er to benefit
from the boost to their econom ies
from the injection o f d rug money,
or because they felt powerless to act
individually against the vast re
sources available to the d ru g traf
fickers.
A ttem pts by the countries o f the
C aribbean to com e together and to
cooperate m ore closely have gener
ally m et lim ited success—even with
com m on language groups. Cross
language cooperation (e.g.,
E nglish/S panish) has been virtually
nonexistent. A regional approach
offers the only effective way to fight
the d ru g problem in the C aribbean.
T he region abounds with regional
organizations, bu t apart from odd
exceptions such as the West Indies
cricket team and the University of
the West Indies, few have been
m uch m ore than fora for m eeting
and talking.
E u r o p e a n U n i o n I n it ia t iv e

In April 1996, a team of eight
E uropean U nion (EU) D rug
experts produced a re p o rt which
form ed the basis for the Plan of
Action adopted at a m eeting orga
nized by the U nited Nations D rug
C ontrol Program (UNDCP) and
hosted by Barbados in May 1996.
Over 250 delegates from every
C aribbean country attended, along
side delegations from N orth
Am erica and Europe. For the first

time, the nations of the C aribbean
adopted a raft o f practical proposals
to strengthen the regional effort
against the d ru g problem . The
Plan o f Action was an encouraging
step to tu rn the tide against the
flow o f drugs.
T he E uropean U nion team was
com prised o f experts from Britain,
France, the N etherlands and Spain,
countries with the closest tradition
al links with the C aribbean. This
team ’s collective antid ru g experi
ence covered all aspects o f the d ru g
problem , from police and customs
interdiction, prosecution and
m oney laundering, to dem and
reduction and rehabilitation. The
EU team included a French profes
sor of toxicology, a D utch prosecu
tor, a Spanish police officer, and a
form er governor o f a British
C aribbean territory. T he team ’s
coordinator, representing the
E uropean Commission, had been
the UNDCP’s representative in the
region for the previous th ree years.
This range o f interests and exper
tise gave the team u n p reced en ted
access and cooperation from all the
countries of the region.
G aps

and

W e a k n e ss e s

As m andated by the E uropean
heads of governm ent—on the ini
tiative of British Prim e M inister
Jo h n Major and French President
Jacques Chirac— the team b ro u g h t
to the forefront a nu m b er o f signifi
cant gaps and weaknesses in the
regional effort to com bat the drug
problem , and m ade specific practi
cal proposals on how to fill these
gaps and overcom e these weakness
es. T he team noted, for example,
that in spite of a plethora o f intelli
gence gathering systems operating
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th ro u g h o u t the region, it was still
n o t possible for every single coun
try to be able to pass drug-related
intelligence inform ation directly,
quickly, and securely to any o th er
to u n try in the region. This draw
back was highlighted when, in the
absence o f such a com m unications
network, m em bers o f the team had
to facilitate a link between Jam aica
and Curasao. Also with regard to
law en fo rcem en t/in terd ictio n m ea
sures— and recognizing that, in
essence, the C aribbean is a sea mass
over or th rough which m ost o f the
drugs transit— the EU team advo
cated the establishm ent o f subre
gional coast guards, tasked and
eq uipped to strengthen the m ar
itim e effort against d ru g trafficking.
I n e f f e c t iv e I m p l e m e n t a t io n

T he different legal jurisdictions
which operate in the C aribbean,
based u p o n English, French, Dutch,
and Spanish systems, m ean that un i
formity of legislation is no t a reality,
but, as is shown within the
E uropean U nion itself, there is
m uch scope for closer harm oniza
tion o f an tid ru g legislation.
Consequently, bilateral and m ulti
lateral treaties and agreem ents on
an tid ru g cooperation can be nego
tiated.
T he EU team found inadequate
the im plem entation o f the legisla
tion. All loo often drug offenders
fail to get convicted in Caribbean
courts through weaknesses in judi
cial prosecution. W hen a drug traf
ficker is caught in a C aribbean
country, a highly paid and experi
enced lawyer appears on the island
to defend the trafficker. Such
lawyers are able to move from one
jurisdiction to an o th er w ithout any

As one reformed addict in the Turks and Caicos Islands
told members of the EU team, “the message against drugs
has to be as powerful as the drugs themselves. ”
difficulty, and have acquired a
degree o f expertise in drug-related
cases. O ften these lawyers are too
well m atched against the over
worked and un d erp aid prosecuting
counsels o f governm ents. The EU
experts proposed developing a
regional cadre o f experienced drug
prosecutors who could be m ade
available to assist any C aribbean
country.
P r e c u r so r s

and

E sse n t ia l C h em ic a ls

The C aribbean is particularly vul
nerable to the illegal transit o f p re
cursors and essential chemicals,
which convert coca leaf into
cocaine. Yet, the EU team found
that virtually nothing is being done
to establish effective control m echa
nisms. Legitim ate use o f precursors
and essential chemicals m ust be
strictly m onitored and enforced. A
com pany which m anufactures
paint, for exam ple, requires ace
tone to dilute color pigm ents when
producing its products. If the
national authorities do no t know
the exact am ount o f acetone
required by the m anufacturer for
legitim ate use, then how can they
control the im portation o f the legit
imately required quantities? T here
is an o th er problem over re-invoicing, a com m on practice in the
im p o rt/e x p o rt business. Precursors
and essential chemicals, norm ally
shipped by sea, are described and
quantified on the original shipping
m anifests and invoices at the port

of loading. However, these can be
m odified or changed once the ves
sel is at sea. T he vessel may also
then head to a different destina
tion, with a “m odified” cargo u n d er
a different description and with
revised quantities. LInless the origi
nal m anifest and invoices are for
w arded by Customs at the p ort of
loading to Customs at the p o rt of
discharge, then no effective control
is possible.
In the Caribbean, responsibility
for the control o f precursors and
essential chemicals is usually given
to m inistries o f health o r industry,
which rarely have the necessary
investigative o r enforcem ent powers
to control m ovem ent o f these p ro d 
ucts. T he N etherlands Antilles is
the sole exception where local legis
lation has been enacted with ade
quate control powers entru sted to
relevant official bodies.
L in k s

w it h

L a t in A m e r ic a

Given that the source of m ost of
the C aribbean’s serious d ru g prob
lem is Latin America, the EU team
found it surprising that th ere are
virtually no links between the two
regions to com bat the d ru g prob
lem. T he team proposed ihe estab
lishm ent o f D rug Liaison Officer
posts m anned by C aribbean officials
in key Latin Am erican countries
such as Colom bia and Venezuela.
To be really effective, such officers
would n eed to act on b eh alf o f all
C aribbean countries. A closer coor
Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Three
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dination of C aribbean law enforce
m en t effort would be required.
T h e G a n ja D il e m m a

It is impossible to address the
d ru g problem s of the Caribbean
w ithout addressing the m arijuana
or ganja problem . Ganja is the
most widely abused d ru g in the
C aribbean and the only one that is
locally grown and produced
(although there are reports of p op
pies being grown in rem ote areas of
Belize and Guyana). Ganja abuse
reportedly dates back to the intro
duction o f in d en tu red workers
from India following the abolition
of slavery. T he word ganja is itself a
H indu word. T he drug has
acquired an accepted socioreligious
use th ro u g h o u t the region, prim ari
ly connected with the Rastafarians,
the socioreligious sect identified
with the late E thiopian em peror
H aile Selassie, also known as Ras
Teferi. However, no t only Rastas
use ganja.
T he EU experts’ re p o rt discarded
the myth th at m arijuana is not
harm ful, or at least, less harm ful
than, for exam ple, alcohol or tobac
co. Medical opinion shows that one
can n o t generalize the effects of
m arijuana. These dep en d upon the
toxicity, which can vary greatly
dep en d in g upon the concentration
of THC. T he health risks of m ari
ju an a, however, should no t be
ignored. D rug rehabilitation cen
ters in Jam aica are constantly deal
ing with the problem o f m arijuana
abuse; for many addicts, m arijuana
has been the “gateway” drug to
m ore harm ful ones (such as
cocaine and hero in). In light of
presentations m ade by C aribbean
Com missioners o f Police and others
who decry having to tie up large
num bers o f their forces on the
eradication o f cannabis, the team,
somewhat controversially, support
ed the view th at the eradication of
ganja and the arrest for simple pos
session should be given a lower pri
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ority within law enforcem ent
efforts. T he EU team also support
ed a call for a study on alternatives
for dealing with the problem s of
the growing and sm oking of ganja.
D em and R e d u c t io n / R

e h a b il it a t io n

Most people in the C aribbean do
no t associate m arijuana with the
evils o f o th er drugs; dem and reduc
tio n /p u b lic education program s are
u n d erm in e d because of this lack of
association. A lthough every gov
e rn m e n t has some form o f public
inform ation cam paign against
drugs, the message is n o t getting
through, especially to the youth in
the com m unities. As one reform ed
addict in the Turks and Caicos
Islands told m em bers of the EU
team, “the message against drugs
has to be as powerful as the drugs
them selves.” T he EU team advocat
ed stronger, m ore targeted cam
paigns—merely copying the mes
sages given in N orth A m erican and
E uropean countries is no t the
answer. Each C aribbean country
m ust devise its own cam paign,
learning from the experience of
others, but taking into account its
own cultural and sociological iden
tities. T he practice of attributing
the street value w hen publicizing
d ru g seizures and confiscations
does no t help. T he fact that x
am o unt o f drugs has street value of
y m illions o f dollars may actually
encourage the young to engage in
d ru g trafficking. T he real value of
seized and confiscated drugs is the
potential num ber of lives that may
have been saved, and the num ber
o f families which may have been
spared misery, deprivation and
hardship.
R ehabilitating drug offenders is a
worthwhile but expensive and timeconsum ing task. This activity lends
itself to closer regional collabora
tion. T he EU team recom m ended
the establishm ent, th ro u g h o u t the
region, o f a network of residential
rehabilitation/detoxification cen

ters m odeled on facilities such as
Sandilands in the Bahamas. These
facilities should com plem ent the
necessary outpatient centers on
every island. T he team also n o ted
the n eed to rehabilitate drug
offenders in prison. O th er than in
Cuba, the majority of inm ates in
C aribbean prisons are on d ru g con
victions. Sadly, many young offend
ers im prisoned for simple posses
sion em erge (after six m onths of
incarceration in cram ped cells with
d rug traffickers) m ore p ro n e to fol
low a life of drugs and crime.
At the en d of the day, rehabilita
tion or interdiction efforts, however
seemingly successful, will merely
curb or contain the d ru g problem .
To make a serious im pact, one m ust
reduce the dem and. All govern
m ent representatives who collabo
rated with the EU team claim ed
that d ru g dem and reduction com 
m anded a high priority in th eir gov
ern m e n t program s. However, when
asked what percentage of govern
m ent revenue was actually chan
neled towards dem and reduction
program s, the answers were invari
ably disappointing.
A t S ta ke

T he d ru g problem is n o t merely
one o f law enforcem en t or health.
T he problem s associated with
drugs and d ru g trafficking re p re
sent the greatest th reat to the sta
bility and developm ent o f the
C aribbean. These problem s are
now u n d erm in in g dem ocracy in
the region. Drugs feed co rru p tio n ,
and co rru p tio n is voracious. D rug
m oney can buy governm ents and
finance political parties. T he cor
ru p tio n from drugs eats away at the
fabric of societies u n til the dem oc
ratic institutions n eed ed to sustain
dem ocracy collapse. C aribbean
dem ocracy is u n d e r th rea t from the
onslaught o f the d ru g m enace.
T he region needs to com e togeth
er, as never before, to fight the
d ru g problem . ■

environmental

so lutions for the world

The Hemispheric Center for Environmental Technology (HCET)
would like to announce the formation of their partnership
HCET's vision is to become a model-bridging institute in the Western Hemisphere
for diffusing environmental technologies that promote mutual economic
benefit and sustainable development in the United States and the Americas.
HCET's mission is to develop and market technologies for
solving environmental problems throughout the Americas.
HCET encourages the development and use of sustainable technologies as a
means of preserving the environment while fostering economic development.
HCET offers the following benefits to partners
in the U.S., Latin America, and the Caribbean:
• Science and engineering capabilities
• Cost-effective technology development
• Technology assessment
• Access to markets and technology resources

For more information, contact:
M. Ebadian, Ph.D.
Hemispheric Center for Environmental Technology
Voice (305) 348-4238/FAX (305) 348-4176
E-mail: ebadian@eng.fiu.edu
World Wide Web Site: http://www.fiu.edu/~hcet
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A Photographic Retrospective
ames Nelson Goodsell
University o f Miami an d with col
passed away in Jan u ary
leagues from the Miami Herald and
1996, leaving b eh in d a
Florida In tern atio n al University.
legacy o f thirty years of
In death, the legacy o f his work
coverage o f Latin Am eri
continues to enlighten all who
ca and the C aribbean for
share a passion for the region.
the Christian Science
Thanks to J im ’s widow, R hoda
Monitor. Those who knew
“Missy” Ford, Hemisphere is able to
his work and his character rem em

share
with its readers a small selec
b er G oodsell’s unselfish nature. He
tion o f thousands o f photographs
shared his knowledge and experi
taken by Goodsell in the 1960s and
ence with num erous reporters who
early 1970s. T he Goodsell collec
covered the region with him. His
tion includes audio and video
readers and viewers will always
tapes, transcripts o f interviews,
rem em b er his insightful colum ns
thousands o f slides, and o th er
and p robing interviews. In the
m aterial that docum ents four
final phase o f his life, Jim shared
decades o f Latin A m erican and
his wisdom with students at the
C aribbean history. In addition to

J
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the photographs re p ro d u ced here,
for exam ple, the collection in
cludes G oodsell’s interviews with
Sandinista leaders, the C ontra
opposition, and others involved in
the C entral A m erican conflict of
the 1980s.
T he collection is available for
viewing at Florida Intern atio n al
University’s library. T he pictures
rep ro d u ced here are also p art o f a
digital library available on the Latin
A m erican and C aribbean C enter
web site (http://w w w .fiu.edu/~lacc).
T he Goodsell collection will ensure
that J im ’s work will co n tin u e to
inspire journalists, academ ics and
students. ■
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From the archives of the late James Nelson Goodsell
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Linden Forbes Burnham, fo rm er prim e minister o f Guyana and
Cheddi J a g a n ’s fo rm er ally from the People's Progressive Party.
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A “you n g”Joaquin Balaguer gives a press confer
ence shortly after being elected presiden t in 1966.
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Symbols o f different times. Chilean presiden t Salvador
Allende— a fe w years before h is assassination in a coup —
an d Fidel Castro are greeted by a Chilean crowd, 1971.
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Leviathan and Lilliputians
J o rg e R o d rig u e z B e r u ff

The United States and
the Caribbean
by Anthony P. Maingot,
Boidder: Westview Press, 1994.

Caribbean Maritime Security
by Michael A. Morris,
London: Macmillan, 1994.

he works u n d er review
bring a new perspective
to the analysis of the
relations between the
h em isphere’s Leviathan
and Lilliputians. At
first glance, The United States and the
Caribbean appears written for the US
academ ic m arket and can serve as a
text for courses on the Caribbean;
this book can also be considered a
worthwhile contem porary source
for policy m akers interested in the
region. A closer exam ination, how
ever, reveals the b ook’s m ore essen
tial character. The United States and
the Caribbean contributes to the
C aribbean political and intellectual
debate on the m ost effective
approach th at C aribbean leaders
should take, given the huge asym
m etries o f power and geopolitical
reality of existing within the US
“sphere o f influence.” A nthony
M aingot consciously places his views
within a historically defined “cen
trist” position. According to
M aingot, the reg ion’s approach to
the US should fall halfway between
the polar response of total sub
servience and intransigent con
frontation. H ence, he dissents from

Jorge Rodriguez Beruff is professor of
Political Science at the University of
Puerto-Rio Piedras.
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the (allegedly) radical anti-im perial
ist stance of one o f his intellectual
m entors, G ordon Lewis.
M aingot stresses that from a
C aribbean viewpoint, negotiation
with the US based on com m on
goals is the only viable approach.
Currently, the com m on goals can
be described as the struggle against
drugs and its spinoff of corruption
and m oney laundering, regional
security, the prom otion o f dem ocra
tic institutions and, what he calls
the “synergies” o f the US-Caribbean
relationship: cultural links and
trade.
T h ro u g h o u t the book, M aingot
offers examples of successful
attem pts at negotiation by
C aribbean leaders—even at the
height of the Cold War— and
underscores the many failures of
leaders such as C heddi Jagan of
Guyana, Michael Manley of Jam aica,
and Maurice Bishop of Grenada.
Wily Eric Williams of Trinidad and
Tobago is seen as a Caribbean
politician who knew how to maxi
mize his m aneuverability while not
openly breaking with the US.
M aingot also describes with great
relish Williams’s twists and turns in
playing the “Cuba card.” More
broadly, M aingot’s sympathies lie
with the postwar generation of
reform ist political leaders known as
the izquierda democratica, which
included Jose Figueres, Luis Munoz
M arin, Rom ulo Gallegos, and
Rom ulo Betancourt.
According to M aingot, national
ism and radical anti-imperialism,
grounded on historical grievances,
have been obstacles in dealing with
the US. M aingot argues that “some
o f the m ore enduring attitudes and
perceptions have to do with symbol

ic, no t m aterial grievances o r satis
factions.” T he au th o r associates
these ideological trends to what he
calls “state-centric” conceptions of
sovereignty. Consequently, he raises
the issue o f the m eaning of sover
eignty in the C aribbean. M aingot
believes that sovereignty should not
be considered the static and
absolute “state o f grace” of the
G rotian tradition, but a dynamic
concept intrinsically related to the
dem ocratic expression of the inter
ests o f the populations o f Caribbean
societies. Sovereignty, therefore,
should be exercised within the con
fines of the reg io n ’s relationship of
“com plex in terd e p en d en c e” with
the US. Consequently, the au th o r
pays m uch attention to the polar
cases of Cuba and Puerto Rico.
R egarding the structure of the
book, the first three chapters trace,
in broad outline, the historical
developm ent o f US-Caribbean rela
tions from the 19th century
through World War II. In his
account of the historical roots of
the US-Caribbean relations,
M aingot equivocally asserts that
these roots have been grounded,
from the US vantage point, in
geopolitical and security considera
tions. In the introduction, he states,
“if one were to choose a single word
to encapsulate C aribbean history,
that word would have to be ‘geopol
itics,’ the relationship between
geography and international rela
tions.”
M aingot’s conception of geopoli
tics, however, precludes any consid
eration of the interplay am ong eco
nom ic, military, and political inter
ests during the period he discusses.
In fact, the au th o r dismisses the
im portance of econom ic factors.

F

Geoeconom ics is excluded as an
im portant co m ponent o f geopoli
tics. Nevertheless, the discussion of
cu rren t trends, challenges, and
threats to the region focuses on
such issues as m igration and the
internationalization of crime, which
clearly have econom ic implications.
T he first two chapters deal with
US interventionism up to 1935. The
most interesting contribution of
these chapters is the perceptive
observation of the lasting im print
left in the regional collective m em o
ry by the arro g an t and racist atti
tudes displayed by the US. The
third chapter, the m ost original and
interesting in this part o f the work,
discusses strategic m ilitary develop
m ents du rin g World War II, particu
larly the decisive im pact o f the
“Battle o f the C aribbean” waged
against the G erm an subm arine
offensive. T he consideration o f two
oth er aspects of the strategic situa
tion, namely, the im portance
attached to air war and the geopo
litical role of Brazil p rio r to 1941,
would have strengthened M aingot's
sharp analysis.
Part Two of the book includes
three chapters on US “contain
m en t” strategies in C entral America
and the C aribbean and the policies
toward the English-speaking
C aribbean d uring the Reagan era.
Particularly interesting is chapter 4,
which contrasts the outcom es o f the
political processes in Costa Rica and
Guyana, as well as the prom inent
role played by the CIA during this
era. T he author, however, did not
dwell m uch on the 1965 US inva
sion o f the Dom inican Republic, an
event th at perhaps did not fit well
into the main thrust o f his argu
m ent.
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T he concluding part o f the book
focuses on several dim ensions of
the contem porary regional situation
that im pinge on both US and
Caribbean interests and create com 
m on basis for collaboration. These
areas include the internationaliza
tion of corruption and violence, the
“offshore" developm ent strategy
and its relationship to corruption
and m oney laundering, m igration,
and the prom otion o f democracy.
Part T hree is an o th er high point
o f the book. C hapters 8 and 9, in
particular, are excellent, and make
persuasive argum ents about the
m agnitude of some of the threats
posed to both the state and the pri
vate sector. In short, M aingot’s book
is a scholarly, well-written, con
sciously polem ical, and thought-pro
voking contribution to Caribbean
scholarship. The United States and the
Caribbean should be read by
C aribbean intellectuals and political
leaders o f all persuasions.
Although Michael M orris deals
with a narrow er topic than M aingot,
in several ways Caribbean Maritime
Security is related to M aingot’s work,
notably to the pertinence o f a
geopolitical approach to interna
tional relations in the Caribbean
and the new challenges to regional
security in the post-Cold War era.
Unlike M aingot’s book, the work by
M orris explores an aspect of the
regional situation on which there is
a glaring dearth o f inform ation and
research. Caribbean Maritime Security
is therefore a unique contribution
to the literature on regional security
that should stimulate fu rth er
research on naval and m aritim e
issues.
M orris notes the apparent para
dox represented by the evident
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im portance o f the m aritim e
dim ension o f C aribbean history,
on the one hand, and the appar
en t neglect o f m aritim e policies
by C aribbean states, on the other.
This contradiction is of particular
concern to the au th o r as “...mar
itime affairs and security prom ise
to be central to the future of
Caribbean states.” The im por
tance o f naval and m aritim e mat
ters to the C aribbean has been
enhanced by the expansion of
national m aritim e zones brought
about by the 1982 Law o f the Sea
C onvention, and by the dual chal
lenges of seaborne illegal m igra
tion and the burgeoning drug
trade. Naval policy in the
Caribbean relates mainly to
national coast guard capabilities,
since only large states such as the
U nited States have the capacity to
project conventional naval power
based on large navies. Thus, the
book focuses mainly on coast
guards and their “offshore
enforcem ent” role.
In C hapter 2, the au th o r pro
vides a m uch needed overview of
existing naval forces and capabili
ties. In his typology, only
Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico
have offshore territorial defense
capabilities. Cuba and the
Dom inican Republic are classified
as having inshore territorial
defense capabilities, and in both
cases the tendency points toward
a possible weakening o f those
capabilities. (The end o f Soviet
support is m entioned in the case
o f Cuba and the obsolescent
equipm ent and budgetary con
straints o f the Dom inican
Republic is also discussed.) The
rest o f the naval forces o f Central
H em isphere • Volume Seven, N um ber Three
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America and the Caribbean are clas
sified as "token.” M orris also
divides the regional coast guards
into three groups: multimission,
inshore, and p ort and harbor. This
chapter also provides invaluable
m aterial on personnel, military
expenditure, arm s transfers, and US
assistance.
T he third chapter and an appen
dix provide a general overview of
the naval aspects o f the Cold War in
the C aribbean, analyzing the role of
the US, the USSR, Cuba and other
C aribbean states. The author
argues that never throughout the
Cold War, except during the Cuban
missile crisis, did the sporadic and
lim ited presence o f the USSR (or
the mainly defensive naval potential
of Cuba) pose a m ajor naval chal
lenge to the US. M orris’s argum ent
underscores how blown out o f pro
portion was C uba’s “naval th rea t”
during the heyday of the Cold War.
Yet, missing from this chapter is a
discussion o f the US base system
and the naval com m and structure
relevant to the Caribbean.
In the next two chapters, Morris
turns to m ore contem porary issues
with evident m aritim e security impli
cations: illegal im m igration and
d ru g trafficking. C oncerning the
form er, he describes the m aritim e
flows o f em igrants from Cuba, Haiti,
and the Dom inican Republic to the
US, and provides an appendix with
a useful m igration chronology.
M orris suggests that a m ore restric
tive US im m igration policy, without
m ajor internal changes within
Caribbean societies, will result in
continued illegal m igration flows.
In reference to drug trafficking,
M orris emphasizes the im portance
o f interdiction for both the US and
C aribbean states. Despite some suc
cesses in interdiction efforts, such as
O peration Bahamas and the Turks
and Caicos (OPBAT), the flow of
drugs to the US continues, and new
routes to Europe have em erged. A
feature o f this flow is the fluidity
60
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and the islands have greater leeway
in dealing with th em .” He suggests
that besides challenges posed by
drugs and m igration, m aritim e
boundary delim itation and ocean
m anagem ent may have even greater
m aritim e im portance for small
C aribbean states. According to
Morris, m aritim e policy is an area
requiring increased international
collaboration.
In sum, Caribbean Maritime Security
is a required reading for scholars
and policy m akers interested in con
tem porary issues o f Caribbean
international relations and security.
This book represents the only com
prehensive study on C aribbean
naval capabilities and coast guard
forces.
The United States and the Caribbean
and Caribbean Maritime Security p ro
vide new and original approaches to
studying regional problem s, while
suggesting im portant issues for
future research and scholarship. ■

and capacity of drug operators to
shift routes. Thus, M orris is able to
persuade us that drugs and migra
tion will continue to engage the
naval and coast guard capabilities of
the US and regional states.
O ne o f the many geostrategic
issues discussed in Caribbean
Maritime Security is that of Caribbean
straits or Sea Lanes of Com m unica
tion (SLOCs). According to the
writer, 10 o f the 26 strategically
im portant straits are located in the
Caribbean. Moreover, these straits
played vital roles in the US-Soviet
confrontation during the Cold War.
With the end of the Cold War, the
C aribbean straits lose im portance
from a conventional military p er
spective, but they retain their rele
vance as routes for illegal im m igra
tion and drug trafficking. This
point is fu rth er developed in chap
ter 7. M orris believes that “with the
decline o f the Cold War, local secu
rity issues have gained prom inence
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